

IN

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In this issue

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest is included.

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United Nations Conference on International Organization

PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE

Statement by the Secretary of State¹

THE STEERING COMMITTEE met this afternoon to review the progress made by the Conference and to consider procedures for its remaining work. Progress has been very satisfactory, and we hope it will be possible to complete the drafting of the Charter in about two weeks. Procedures which will assist in reaching that goal were adopted by the Steering Committee.

It is hoped that the technical committees will be able to complete most of their work this week by consolidating amendments of a generally similar nature, so that they can be considered in groups rather than separately, and by assigning the actual drafting of proposals to subcommittees.

Proposals adopted by the technical committees will be reported immediately to the Coordination Committee, which will examine them in relation to the Charter as a whole and redraft them in charter form. This procedure will be followed even when the proposals form only part of a chapter or a section.

Committees may at the same time report their proposals to the appropriate commissions for

simultaneous review of substance. This procedure is within the discretion of the committees.

Proposals which have been redrafted in charter form by the Coordination Committee will then be reported to the commissions for final commission action. It is hoped that this second stage can be reached in the week beginning May twenty-eighth. After the commissions have acted, the Charter as a whole will be reported to plenary sessions of the Conference for final approval and signature.

I wish to emphasize that, while every effort will be made to reach these goals, we must not sacrifice either opportunity for full and free discussion or the utmost care in drafting in the interests of speed alone. The end of the war in Europe has placed us face to face with many urgent problems which require the attention of the delegates at this Conference. But the establishment of the World Organization for which we came here to write the Charter is the only foundation upon which we can proceed to deal successfully with these other problems in the construction of lasting peace.

PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO REGIONAL COMMITTEE

Statement by the Secretary of State¹

[Released to the press by the United States Delegation May 20]

With reference to my statement of May 15, 1945 that "As a result of discussions with a number of interested delegations, proposals will be made to clarify in the Charter the relationship of regional agencies and collective arrangements to the world Organization",² it has been decided that the fol-

lowing proposals will be submitted to the Regional Committee tomorrow:

CHAPTER VIII

SECTION A, Paragraph 3

3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or ju-

¹ Made in San Francisco on May 21, 1945. Mr. Stettinius is Chairman of the Steering Committee.

² BULLETIN of May 20, 1945, p. 930.

dicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,¹ or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

CHAPTER VIII

SECTION B, New Paragraph 12

12. Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. *The member states comprising such agencies or entering into such arrangements should make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through such agencies or arrangements before referring them to the Security Council.* The Security Council should encourage the development of peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

This paragraph in no way impairs the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of section A of this chapter.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

Remarks by Assistant Secretary MacLeish

THIS IS Archibald MacLeish. I had hoped to be back in San Francisco in time for this broadcast.² In some ways, however, a perspective of 3,000 miles is not without its uses. You don't see as much of the brick-by-brick building of the walls, but you get a better sense of the look of the entire building and of the landscape in which it stands.

It looks from here as though the Conference at San Francisco had reached the point in its work at which the old New England farmers used to call in the neighbors for a barn-raising. The foundations, originally laid at Dumbarton Oaks and vastly improved by the four-power discussions at

the beginning of the Conference, are pretty solidly in place, and the technical committees are well along with their job of nailing down the framework. Virtually all that remains to be done now is the drafting work of the Coordinating Committee, the public work of the various commissions, and the plenary sessions at which the technical work will be approved or modified, and the building hoisted into place.

But there is not only the new structure of the international Organization to look at: there is also the world landscape in which the structure will stand. A good many people are discouraged by the look of that landscape. A good many, indeed, are impressed—unhappily impressed—by the contrast between the new and shining structure in process of successful completion in San Francisco and the dark and stormy world beyond its silvery towers.

¹ Amendments are in italics.

² Made on May 26, 1945, on the NBC broadcast entitled "Report from San Francisco: Our Foreign Policy". Mr. MacLeish spoke from Washington; the remainder of the program was broadcast from San Francisco.

Specifically—and there is every reason to be specific—some observers see a striking contrast between our fortunate collaboration with the Russians in San Francisco and what they consider the failure of our collaboration with the Russians in Poland, and elsewhere in eastern Europe.

It is now generally recognized, in spite of differences which have of course occurred, and in spite of the sensational headlines which introduced certain San Francisco stories earlier in the Conference, that the real news of San Francisco is not the alleged crises, clashes, and collisions, but the fact that what might have been crises, and what might have been collisions, turned out, for the most part, to be cordial and understanding agreements.

The so-called regional issue is an excellent example. We and the Russians were described as being completely at loggerheads on that question. When the whole story was in, it became clear, even to those who make a business of discovering differences of opinion, that there had never been a serious difference between the Russian Delegation and our own.

To some, however, the amity and agreement and common purpose in San Francisco merely serve to emphasize, by way of contrast, the dark vistas which observers report in other parts of the world. Political events in Europe are regarded in some quarters not only as denying the promise of San Francisco but as qualifying the hope that the continuing collaboration between the great powers, upon which San Francisco is based, can continue. Certain commentators have even spoken openly of an inevitable conflict of interest between the Russians and ourselves, and have debated the question whether Russia, our present ally in this war, is our enemy or our friend—a curious debate, one would think, with our soldiers living side by side in conquered Germany and our common dead but freshly buried.

All this is as disturbing as it is confusing to the sensible citizens of this country. It would be serious also—tragically serious—if it were not for one thing: that the facts speak for themselves and that what the facts speak of is profoundly reassuring to any man who will open his ears and listen. The facts are these.

First, the Soviet Union and the United States have proved, in the most difficult geographic, economic, and psychological circumstances under which allies have ever attempted to act as allies, that they can work together in the difficult and trying prosecution of a total war.

Second, the United States and the Soviet Union have proved in the laborious conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, and in the delicate negotiations at Yalta, and in the difficult four-power stage at San Francisco, that they can reconcile their views and arrive at common understandings on problems which have resisted, hitherto, the best efforts of the best diplomatic minds of many generations, and which have never yet been solved.

These, however, are only the more obvious facts. There are also certain underlying facts which speak with equal eloquence.

The first is this:

the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union conflict at no point on the earth's surface.

The second is this:

the United States and the Soviet Union are countries independently rich in their own resources, needing little from the world outside.

And there is a third:

the United States and the Soviet Union are both young, strong, self-confident countries, with their own business to attend to; countries which, however they may differ in philosophy, and however they may differ in practice, aim in their several and dissimilar ways at what they believe to be the betterment of the lot of their own people and not at the conquest of the earth.

There is no necessary reason, in other words, in the logic of geography, or in the logic of economics, or in the logic of national objectives, why the United States and the Soviet Union should ever find themselves in conflict with each other, let alone in the kind of conflict reckless and irresponsible men have begun now to suggest.

There are differences between us: real differences. Poland is one. It will take will and time and effort—Russian will and time and effort as well as American will and time and effort—to find an answer to Poland. But there is no necessary or logical reason why an answer to Poland or to any other difference should not be found. Indeed the answers must be found.

What underlies the current talk of inevitable conflict between the two nations, in other words,

is nothing real: nothing logical. The basis of the fear is only fear itself. The basis of the suspicion is nothing more substantial than suspicion.

There are apparently some Americans who are so uncertain of the vigor and vitality of the great American tradition that they feel the safety of our institutions is endangered by the mere existence, on the opposite side of the world, of a different, and to us distasteful, tradition and philosophy. There are doubtless some Russians who have similar fears of the great American democratic tradition which has now emerged from a successful war as the most powerful moral and intellectual force of this generation.

The answer to the fearful in both countries is the answer Mr. Roosevelt made to the fearful few in the United States in 1933: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

I cannot speak for the faint-hearted among the Russians but certainly Americans who have so little faith in the vitality of the American tradition that they fear the presence in the world of a different tradition, and are ready to regard conflict as inevitable, have little understanding of their own people, or the history of their country—have little understanding, above all, of the meaning of the victory their nation and its allies have now won.

It is true, in other words, that the landscape against which the structure of San Francisco has been raised is a clouded landscape. But no one expected that the end of the war would bring a return to perfect peace.

It is true also that there are difficulties—difficulties between the Russians and ourselves—in Poland and in other countries. But no one ever doubted that the transition from war to peace would present the world with many difficulties.

What is important is the fact that the American people and the Russian people have proved in war, and proved in peace, that they are capable of surmounting together the greatest difficulties with which peace or war can face them.

What is important is this: that the true facts about the world, if only we will look at those true facts, prove beyond the possibility of question that there is no reason in logic, and no reason in substance, why the Russians and ourselves, given the will—given the will on both sides—to solve the problems which now face us, cannot make and preserve a long and lasting peace.

Lend-Lease Operations

LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING 19TH QUARTERLY REPORT

[Released to the press by the White House May 22]

To THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

I am transmitting herewith the nineteenth report of operations under the Lend-Lease Act for the period ending March 31, 1945.

On May 6, 1945, Nazi Germany capitulated to the combined forces of the United Nations. Lend-lease and reverse lend-lease as the basic mechanisms of combined allied war supply made a vital contribution to that victory.

The defeat of Germany was the first objective of allied military strategy. There remains, in the Pacific, another powerful and fanatical foe, the Japanese, who, in the never-to-be-forgotten and fateful Sunday of December 7, 1941, struck at Pearl Harbor in a treacherous blow against the peace and security of the world. They, too, must be taught that the peace and security of the world are sacred and not to be broken by any aggressor nation.

While the bulk of the United Nations forces were engaging the Nazis in Europe, allied forces succeeded in piercing the perimeter of Japanese defenses and established the bases from which decisive offensives can be launched. Now all of the might and power of the United States, the British Empire, France, the Netherlands, and our other allies can be brought to bear, together with the Chinese forces, against Japan.

Long and costly as the struggle ahead may be, it has been immeasurably shortened by the system of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease. To crush Nazi and Japanese tyranny, we have sent overseas to join our allies on the battlefield American fighting men equipped with the best weapons American ingenuity and skill can produce. They have been further strengthened through reverse lend-lease with all that they needed which our fighting allies could provide. Our fighting partners at the front had more men for the battle than they could supply and, through lend-lease, we sent the weapons, the food, and the material with which they could bear fully their burden of the battle.

We cannot measure the sacrifice and heroism of our American forces on the war front or the efforts of the men and women on the production front here at home. Nor can we measure the contribution to victory of those allied fighting men who, with their own and lend-lease weapons, fought and fell, or the courage and valor of their people behind the lines who, steadfastly through long years under attack, produced the food and tools needed for victory. Each of the United Nations has contributed to the pool of fighting power in accordance with its abilities and capacities.

Adjustments and reductions in allied war production and in the lend-lease program will be possible even as we and our allies throw augmented forces into the decisive offensives against the Japanese. The task of reconversion and reconstruction is commencing. At the same time lend-lease and reverse lend-lease must continue as a military necessity on the scale required to build the overwhelming power which alone can save American and allied lives and bring an early and complete end to this terrible war.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 22, 1945.

Harry Hopkins and Joseph E. Davies on Special Missions for the President

[Released to the press by the White House May 23]

The President has requested Harry Hopkins and Joseph E. Davies to undertake special missions for him.

Mr. Hopkins will proceed in company with Ambassador Averell Harriman to Moscow to converse with Marshal Stalin upon matters now in discussion between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States.

Mr. Davies will go directly to London to discuss with Prime Minister Churchill and other members of the British Government certain matters of common interest to the United States and Great Brit-

ain arising out of the war. His work in London will, of course, be integrated with that of the American Embassy there, as will be the work of Mr. Hopkins with that of the Embassy in Moscow.

The President believes Mr. Davies and Mr. Hopkins are peculiarly qualified to undertake these missions by reason of their extensive experience in international affairs.

Upon their return to the United States the two emissaries will report personally to the President.

Announcement Concerning Displaced Persons in Europe

[Released to the press May 22]

For the benefit of many inquirers the State Department announces that in view of the conditions prevailing at this time in conquered Germany and areas recently liberated from German control it is not yet possible for individuals in the United States to send either messages or relief shipments to displaced persons there. After consultation with the appropriate agencies, including the War Department, assurance can, however, be given to anxious relatives and friends that both military and civil authorities are making every effort to care for these displaced persons and to obtain and compile information on each individual case. Persons in the United States who wish information concerning the welfare and whereabouts of specific individuals in Germany should be guided by the following:

The State Department at Washington will accept inquiries concerning American citizens. Inquiries about aliens, whether relatives of American citizens or not, cannot be undertaken by the State Department or by other United States Government agencies. Inquiries concerning United Nations nationals (i. e. nationals of Belgium, the Netherlands, France, etc.) should be submitted to the appropriate diplomatic missions at Washington. Inquiries concerning refugees, stateless persons, persons of indeterminate nationality, etc., may be sent to any one of the following private organizations, all of which are in a position to refer them to the central relief agencies in Europe:

The American Christian Committee for Refugees, Inc., 139 Centre Street, New York City; the American Friends Service Committee, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia; the Unitarian Service Committee, 9 East 46th Street, New York City; the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, 425 Lafayette Street, New York City; the International Migration Service, 122 East 22d Street, New York City; the National Council of Jewish Women, Inc., 1819 Broadway, New York City; the National Refugee Service, Inc., 139 Centre Street, New York City.

Preparations for Third Inter-American Radio Conference

[Released to the press May 24]

The State Department announced that a government-industry meeting was held in the Department of State on May 23, 1945 under the chairmanship of Dr. J. H. Dellinger of the National Bureau of Standards for the purpose of inaugurating preparations for the Third Inter-American Radio Conference, which is scheduled to convene in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on September 3, 1945.

The meeting was devoted to a consideration of a proposed agenda submitted by the Government of Brazil and to items in the existing inter-American radio agreements which should be studied. For these purposes six committees were set up for study of inter-American projects. They are as follows:

Committee on Organizational Matters under the chairmanship of H. B. Otterman, Department of State.

Committee on Technical Matters under the chairmanship of Col. A. G. Simson, of the Army Signal Corps.

Committee on Aeronautical Matters under the chairmanship of Lloyd H. Simson, of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Committee on Short Wave Broadcasting Problems under the chairmanship of George P. Adair, of the Federal Communications Commission.

Committee on Miscellaneous Operational Matters under the chairmanship of Capt. E. M. Webster, of the Coast Guard.

Committee on Rates Problems under the chairmanship of Commissioner Ray C. Wakefield, of the Federal Communications Commission.

The Committee on Aeronautical Matters held a preliminary meeting on the morning of May 24, 1945. All of the committees, with the exception of that dealing with rates problems, will meet in the Department of State in room 446, during May 31, June 1, and June 2, on the following schedule:

May 31, 1945, 9:30 a.m.	Committee on Organizational Matters.
May 31, 1945, 2 p.m.	Committee on Miscellaneous Matters.
June 1, 1945, 9:30 a.m.	Committee on Technical Matters.
June 3, 1945, 9:30 a.m.	Committee on Aeronautical Matters.
June 3, 1945, 2 p.m.	Committee on Short Wave Broadcasting Problems.

Transfer of German Property to United States Government

[Released to the press May 23]

At 3:30 p. m., E.W.T., Wednesday, May 23, 1945, the United States Government, acting as trustee for the governments assuming power in Germany and in consideration of the total defeat of Germany, formally took over the property of the German Embassy in Washington.¹ A certificate acknowledging the transfer was signed by Assistant Secretary of State Julius C. Holmes and Charles Bruggmann, Minister of Switzerland. The certificate included various papers such as an inventory of the effects in the Embassy, warehouse receipts, deeds to property, and other evidences of properties held in this country.

Errata

BULLETIN of May 6, 1945, in article, "This Hemisphere", by S. W. Boggs, page 846, figure 3, "The map-maker's conventional 'western hemisphere'": on circular hemisphere, substitute letters "N I A CV" for "N I A C"; in legend under figure 3, eleventh line, substitute "CV, Cape Verde Islands" for "C, Canary Islands".

¹ BULLETIN of May 13, 1945, p. 900.

Renewal of Trade Agreements Act

Statement by ACTING SECRETARY GREW

[Released to the press May 22]

I am naturally very much pleased with the action of the House Ways and Means Committee in reporting the Doughton bill favorably and without limiting amendments.

The attitudes of governments toward world trade problems will not remain as fluid as they now are. Many nations will shortly make firm and binding decisions which will determine in large part the shape of the world economy for years to come.

The sum total of those decisions will set the ball rolling either toward narrow economic nationalism, characterized by a growth in tariffs, quotas, subsidies, discriminations, and state control of foreign trade, or toward the opposite goal of lowered barriers, more trade, greater productivity, and greater material well-being.

The fate of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act may well tip the balance in one direction or the other. The economic power of the United States is so great that few nations can afford to set their plans in motion without knowledge of our intentions.

If the Doughton bill were to fail, the event would be widely interpreted as indicating that the United States was drifting back to economic isolationism, and other nations would act accordingly. Its success would strengthen the prestige and influence of our friends throughout the world who share our creed of economic liberalism and free enterprise.

The minority on the Ways and Means Committee offered an amendment to renew the Trade Agreements Act without change for only one year. Fortunately, this amendment was defeated. Since the record shows that most trade agreements take more than one year to complete, the effect of this amendment would be to tie the hands of the Government for the next 12 crucial months.

The passage of the Doughton bill would give notice to the world that the United States means

Vote of the House of Representatives¹

Statement by ACTING SECRETARY GREW

[Released to the press May 26]

The vote in the House of Representatives today on the trade-agreements program will hearten every friend of international collaboration. The power granted by the legislation, wisely used, can greatly promote prosperity in the United States and throughout the world.

to back up its faith in the liberal private-enterprise system with the action necessary to make that system work.

Address by CHARLES P. TAFT²

[Released to the press May 22]

I am very glad of this opportunity to talk to an audience which has been bombarded with arguments on the tariff. You know the trouble ordinarily in political debates in this country is that each side beats the air in front of its own supporters and never meets the issue with those who either are opposed or are not informed. I'm ready to assume that you who are gathered here tonight are in considerable part against the Doughton bill, because I have seen a good deal of the propaganda that has been spread in Orange County. That gives me a chance to persuade you that you have been misinformed and that your own interests require you to support the Doughton bill. I'm ready to answer any questions you can put to me, when I finish, and we'll end the evening understanding each other better than we do now.

¹ On May 26, 1945 the House of Representatives passed the Doughton bill by a vote of 239 to 153.

² Delivered before the Chamber of Commerce in Newburgh, N. Y., on May 22, 1945. Mr. Taft is Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State.

I want to begin by quoting what my friend Representative Dan Reed, from upper New York State and an opponent of the bill, said to me in cross-examination Saturday a week ago before the Ways and Means Committee. He referred to "a group of internationally minded people down in the State Department . . . trying to arrange these tariff duties without taking into consideration the problems of the local industries". Then later he said, "I think we have carried our idealistic policy and generosity a long, long way beyond our vital interest."

The first thing I would say is that the State Department has to take into consideration the whole interest of the United States. Just like the President or any of the other executive departments, we work for the whole people, not just one congressional district. Whenever possible, we must reconcile the interests of as many districts as possible, but sometimes there is no way to decide that may not damage somebody a little. When we act, we only do so on the basis of the substantial agreement of all the agencies of the government concerned, and the approval of the President. That means real and serious consideration of the interests of Orange County as well as all others.

The main thing I want to say to you, though, on this point is to tell you what our job is in the State Department. We are not special pleaders for foreigners. But things happen abroad which are a danger to the United States interests, or which warn that something will happen in the future that may be a danger to us. Do you want the Government to keep track of things like that? Of course you do! That is the job of the Department of State. We look around the world to see what is happening, and we study out what it might do to the United States and what measures ought to be taken to prevent it, or what measures ought not to be taken here at home because they would make it worse abroad and do us more damage. Then we push those measures. What else would you want us to do? Surely you can only give one answer: we ought to stand up and shout what we believe is in the U.S. interest. That is what I'm doing now. That is what I call internationally minded, and that is our job. But our interest and our objective is the national interest of the United States—no more, no less. We are as good Americans as anybody, and we know that we can see farther than some. We are not

ashamed of being idealistic and generous, if that is in the American interest. We give nothing away otherwise.

With that general beginning, I am going to get right down to earth. The Orange County Chamber of Commerce has been one of many in this country attacking the Doughton bill. Their letter of April 24, 1945 says:

"The effect of this reduction in tariff protection to manufacturers in this country would be in many cases crippling. It would mean the importation of foreign material and production at prices which we could not possibly meet competitively. The result would be companies going out of business and many jobs lost."

That is the standard line of the American Tariff League, which by constant repetition they have sold to many unwary producers, and it is completely and totally false. Let me give you two very specific examples.

You have a big dairy business in Orange County. The dairymen in the United States are traditionally opposed to the reciprocal-trade-agreements program. But you Orange County dairymen are fair, I'm sure. You're intelligent enough to worry about what affects you here in this country and let Wisconsin dairy farmers worry about what they believe affects them. If I were talking in upper New York State or Land O' Lakes, Wisconsin, I'd be prepared to answer what worries them. Here I'm talking to you about what may worry you.

You furnish milk to New York. Your prosperity depends on the prosperity of your customers. Your customers buy more milk and cream and butter and cottage cheese and eggs when they are earning more money. You are selling more to New York than ever before probably, though I don't have your latest figures. But pre-war you sold 25 million gallons of milk to New York in 1934 and 29 million gallons in 1939. Did the Canadian agreement hurt you? Did foreign production come in at prices you couldn't meet, and force you out of business because of tariff cuts or quota increases in any trade agreement? On the contrary, your business increased while this program was in effect. I don't say this program did it all, but I'm certain it helped improve New York - area employment. Our business with trade-agreement countries increased twice as fast in that five-year period as it did with non-agreement countries.

Let me take another sample. You have blown-glass works in this neighborhood. Representatives of that industry came to Washington and howled bloody murder about what Czech glass had done to them in 1938. One of them from Bellaire in my State of Ohio testified he had to discontinue several lines, and lost one third of his production. But it then appeared that his total sales volume did not drop. What kind of injury do you call that? Is that putting people out of business or destroying jobs? The witness blamed it all on imports of Czech glass, but I know as an Ohioan that Bellaire lost out as a glass center (hand-made) not to Czechoslovakia but to Lancaster, Ohio, where they manufacture by machine. And the final fact is that imports from Czechoslovakia did not flood the country. Here are the figures of Czech glassware imports (other than containers) affected by the agreement:

1937:	\$5,017,007
1938:	3,786,898
1939:	2,817,316

Of course the war hit Czechoslovakia, and the agreement was called off in March 1939, but the figures show enough to disprove the wild propaganda of the American Tariff League.

Now let me go at this on a really logical basis. What you people who work at Stroock's or Firth Carpet or American Felt Company want to know is whether any of us bureaucrats in Washington have any interest in your jobs, or whether we work somewhere in the stratosphere and are willing to plow under anybody who doesn't fit in with our theories. How do we work out one of these trade agreements?

The first thing I want to say is that they are not free-traders and are not aiming toward free trade. Mr. Hull is not a free-trader. Mr. Stroock says otherwise, but he must show me the words of Mr. Hull, in quotes. Here is what Mr. Hull said before the Ways and Means Committee in 1943 when Congressman Gearhart asked if he didn't believe in free trade.

"I haven't known any person who ever thought seriously about literal free trade . . . If the Congressman ever looked up my record he never heard me mention the words 'free trade' in my life, or heard me intimate remotely anything that he is implying now."

Will Clayton is not a free-trader. I am not a free-trader. The operating people in the State, Agri-

culture, Commerce Departments and the Tariff Commission are not free-traders.

But what you are interested in is how we actually operate. Here is a simple description of it that telescopes in a few moments a process that takes from 5 to 29 months and averages over 12 months. This comes from the testimony three weeks ago of Oscar Ryder, the Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission.

"When the suggestion is made, usually by the Department of State, that the question of making an agreement with country X should be considered, an interdepartmental country committee is set up to make a study of the feasibility of such an agreement. To throw light on this question, the committee makes up two tentative lists, one of the articles on which we would probably ask concessions of country X, and the other of articles with respect to which country X would probably ask concessions of us. These two lists, with the recommendations for or against the initiation of negotiations, go to the Trade Agreement Committee, which decides whether or not it will recommend to the Secretary of State and the President that negotiations with country X be undertaken. If the decision is to recommend negotiations, the two schedules are carefully reviewed and revised by the Trade Agreements Committee and as revised are transmitted to the Secretary of State and the President with its recommendations.

"When the proposal to negotiate with country X has been approved by the Secretary of State and the President, formal discussions are then begun with country X of our illustration. If country X is willing to negotiate, the first step is to secure agreement upon the articles with respect to which the United States will consider making duty concessions. This is necessary because of the practice of giving public notice listing all such articles. Country X, of course, will almost certainly wish to enlarge the list of articles already approved by the Trade Agreements Committee on which the United States will negotiate. Usually, the requests for additional listings are granted unless there are strong reasons for not doing so. It is, however, made crystal clear that in any case the listing of an article may not be taken as indicating that a concession will actually be made. In fact, an examination of the record will show that in negotiations under the Trade Agreements Act many of the articles listed were not made the subject of concessions.

"The list of United States products to be made the subject of negotiation having been agreed upon, the Secretary of State simultaneously announces the negotiations with country X, and publishes the list. At the same time, the Committee for Reciprocity Information makes a public call not only for information on the question of concessions by the United States on the articles listed but also for information regarding the articles on which the United States should ask concessions of country X. A final date is set for the filing of briefs and announcement is made of the date of the public hearing.

"All the information obtained in the briefs and given at the public hearing is analyzed and summarized by the Committee for Reciprocity Information and transmitted to the Trade Agreements Committee and to the subcommittee on country X.

"The ball now passes to the country committee, which has the duty of formulating for submission to the Trade Agreements Committee tentative schedules of the concessions to be requested of country X (known as schedule 1), and of concessions which the United States will be prepared to offer initially in return for the concessions to be requested (known as schedule 2). In preparing these schedules, the country committee draws on information from two sources—first, the information submitted by producing, importing, exporting, and other interests through the Committee for Reciprocity Information; and, second, the information and advice submitted by Government agencies pursuant to section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act. The Tariff Commission is primarily responsible for supplying information regarding possible concessions by the United States; the Department of Commerce, for supplying information regarding the concessions to be requested of country X; the State Department, for supplying information regarding the general provisions; the Department of Agriculture, for supplying special information on agricultural commodities; and the Treasury Department, for supplying information on customs matters.

"The part played by the Tariff Commission in supplying information regarding possible concessions by the United States is particularly pertinent to my later testimony regarding the means taken to safeguard domestic producing interests. For each article included in the published list of articles on which the United States will consider making concessions, the Commission prepares what

we call a digest summarizing all the information available which may throw light on the competitive position of the domestic industry with respect to imports. Each digest, which is prepared by the commodity expert on the article in question, collaborating with economists of the Commission's staff, is reviewed by a committee of the Commission composed of both Democratic and Republican members of the Commission. Every effort is made to have the digests as complete and as objective and devoid of bias as possible. Members of the Ways and Means Committee are familiar with the caliber of our reports in this respect; for the material which we furnish the trade-agreements organization in these digests is the same kind of material that we furnished your committee in connection with the congressional tariff revisions of 1922 and 1930.

"But supplying written material in the form of digests is not the only way in which the Commission assists the country subcommittees. It also puts at their disposal, as it put at the disposal of congressional committees in tariff revisions, the entire expert staff of the Commission to furnish needed technical information and advice. Likewise, the country subcommittees have the assistance of experts from State, Commerce, and Agriculture, also the Treasury Department, and, in the case of minerals, the Bureau of Mines. In formulating the schedule of concessions to be asked of the foreign country in question, the subcommittee frequently has the assistance of the commercial attaché stationed in that country and brought back to Washington especially for the purpose.

"When the country subcommittee has completed its draft of the schedules of the concessions to be sought from the foreign country and of the concessions which we are prepared to offer initially in return, they are submitted to the Trade Agreements Committee. That committee gives both schedules very careful and exhaustive consideration, using not only the report of the country subcommittee but also the Tariff Commission digests on commodities on which duty reductions are proposed. As the member of the committee from the Tariff Commission, I have regarded it as my special function to see that full consideration is given to the possible effects of any proposed concession on the domestic producing interest involved. Frequently the question of a duty with respect to a given commodity is referred back to the country committee for further study and

report. Sometimes, it is necessary before making a decision to have a special inquiry made by the Tariff Commission. One example in connection with the agreement with Mexico comes to mind. In considering the schedule of concessions to be made by the United States as recommended by the Mexican Country Committee, I was not satisfied with the information on one of the principal items on which the maximum duty reduction was proposed, and, on my suggestion, decision on this item was deferred until a field investigation could be made by the Tariff Commission. Two or three months' travel on the part of two of the ablest experts of the Tariff Commission was involved. As a result of their report the Trade Agreements Committee decided to make less than the maximum permitted reduction in the duty on the article in question.

"When the Trade Agreements Committee has finally agreed upon the two schedules and they have been approved by the Secretary of State and the President, negotiation of the agreement is begun. The United States negotiating group is headed by an official of the State Department and usually includes the members of the country committee who represent the Tariff Commission, Commerce, and Agriculture. The negotiators are under instructions to make every effort to obtain from the foreign country the duty concessions contained in the schedule of desired concessions approved by the President, and they may not, without authorization, agree to concessions in United States tariffs other than, or in excess of, those included in the approved schedule of possible United States concessions. Frequently, however, points arise in the course of the negotiations which the negotiators have to refer to the Trade Agreements Committee for further instructions. In particular, the Trade Agreements Committee must be consulted when the negotiators find it necessary in order to come to an agreement with the foreign country to have the authority to take less than asked or give more than authorized. Any departure, however, from either schedule requires approval not only of the Trade Agreements Committee but of the Secretary of State and the President, and such approval, if given, is given only after most careful consideration and a thorough weighing of all the factors involved.

"By this procedure the Trade Agreements Committee, the Secretary of State, and the President are kept informed of the progress of negotiations

and make the major decisions which determine the character of the agreement. When, therefore, the negotiating committee lays the completed agreement before them for approval, they are already familiar with its principal features. Nevertheless, the Trade Agreements Committee studies it carefully in every detail before recommending its approval.

"As will become apparent from the foregoing account of the procedure in making a trade agreement, the effort is made to insure that all interests in our national economy, and especially domestic producing interests, are adequately safeguarded. Situations existing, or foreseen, at the time an agreement is made are taken into account in making the agreement, usually by specific provisions relating to specific concessions. It is recognized, however, that, notwithstanding all the care and caution exercised, mistakes may be made. All along, moreover, it has been recognized that under the changing and uncertain economic conditions which have existed since the passage of the Trade Agreements Act situations unforeseen at the time a particular agreement is made might arise thereafter and cause such excessive imports as to threaten injury to domestic interests. A sincere effort has been made to guard against such contingencies. Various special provisions designed especially for this purpose have been included in the trade agreements now in effect. Such safeguarding provisions doubtless will assume greater importance in any agreements which may be made in the difficult transition period which will follow the cessation of hostilities.

"As has been indicated, some of the safeguards included in trade agreements apply to individual commodities on which duty concessions are made and relate to situations existing or foreseen at the time the concessions are made. Safeguards of this type are designed specifically to limit the increase in imports which may result from specific duty concessions. Sometimes this is accomplished simply by providing that the reduced duty on a given commodity shall apply only upon imports up to a specified quantity, imports in excess of that quantity continuing dutiable at the higher rate. Examples are the duty reductions on cattle, cream, and potatoes made in the trade agreement with Canada.

"More frequently, however, the limitation on the degree of increase in imports which may result from a given duty concession is accomplished by

narrowing, in one way or another, the scope of the concessions. Sometimes, particularly in the case of fresh fruits and vegetables, the scope of the concession is limited to imports in a specified season of the year. In other cases, its scope is narrowed by setting up a special tariff classification within a classification in the tariff act. This method of reclassification, or subclassification, has been used in the various trade agreements. It is especially useful in cases where imports of a given commodity come principally from two countries but in such markedly different grade or type from each of them that they, in effect, constitute different commodities with different competitive problems. This method is employed for the purpose of preserving bargaining power for use in making a trade agreement with the other country. It is also used where a particular duty reduction, under the circumstances, can safely be made to one of the two countries but not to the other. It can, I think, be disclosed now that this method was used to prevent the cheaper and more competitive grades of commodities coming from Japan from getting the benefit of the concessions made to European countries on the more expensive grades of the same commodities. Examples are the reclassifications made to prevent Japanese producers from getting the benefits of the concessions made to the United Kingdom on pottery, cotton cloth, and various other products.

"In order to protect against unforeseen situations which may develop after a trade agreement is made, more general safeguards are required than those which relate to individual concessions. For this purpose, various types of safeguarding provisions have been included in practically all agreements authorizing action to take care of special situations that may arise. In the earlier agreements, the endeavor was to include a separate provision to safeguard against each of the various contingencies envisaged as sufficiently within the realm of possibility to warrant such a precaution. I shall not attempt to discuss all the provisions of this type included in the various agreements. For my purpose, it will suffice to mention only two of the more important and the more frequently occurring ones. One is a provision, contained in practically all of the earlier agreements, permitting termination or modification on short notice should wide variations in the exchange rates between the currencies of the United States and the foreign

country party to any agreement threaten serious injury to industries in either country. The other is a provision, contained in many of the earlier agreements, permitting the withdrawal or modification of any concession if third countries should obtain the major benefit of the concession and if in consequence imports of the article concerned should threaten serious injury to producers in either of the countries parties to the agreement.

"In later agreements the endeavor to include in each trade agreement separate articles to safeguard against various specified contingencies has, in general, been abandoned, because, for one reason, of the recognition of the impossibility of foreseeing at the time of making an agreement all the situations which may arise under the agreement to require safeguarding action. Reliance, instead, has been placed largely upon a single general provision broad enough in its scope to afford the basis for speedy action in situations, foreseen or unforeseen, which may arise to threaten injury to producing interests in either of the countries parties to an agreement. Such a provision was first included in the agreement with Argentina, article XII of which stipulates that either country may terminate the arrangement, in whole or in part, on short notice, in the event that any circumstance arises to prejudice its industry or commerce and that it is found impossible to adjust the matter satisfactorily.

"This article in the Argentine agreement was sufficiently broad to provide not only for action in most of the situations for which separate safeguarding provisions had been included in previous agreements, but also for action in most other situations in which injury might result from duty concessions made in a trade agreement. Article XI in the trade agreement with Mexico is superior in that it provides for less drastic action than termination of the agreement, in whole or in part. The article reserves to both the United States and Mexican Governments the right to withdraw or modify the concession made with respect to any article, or to impose a quota limitation on the imports of the article, should such action prove necessary to protect the domestic producers of like or similar articles from serious injury through excessive imports resulting from developments unforeseen at the time the agreement was made. The article provides that the President, upon a finding of facts, is required to take one of the courses of action authorized by the article,

naturally, after consultation with the Mexican Government.

"My understanding is that it is the intention of the trade-agreements organization to recommend the inclusion of appropriate safeguards along the lines of article XI of the Mexican agreement in all subsequent agreements of any considerable importance. Its inclusion will provide, what it is very important to have amid the uncertainties of the post-war transition period, a flexible instrument for prompt and adequate action to prevent injury from an unexpectedly large and excessive increase in imports. And what is just as important to the maintenance of the trade-agreements program, this provision will make it possible for the United States to take such safeguarding action with the minimum of risk of causing the other country party to the agreement to terminate the agreement, in whole or in part, as it of necessity is given the right to do in case of such action. The authority to impose quotas is important in this connection. In temporary emergency situations, such as may arise in the transition period, quotas are probably the most effective method of import control. They may be set at such a figure as to prevent serious injury to producing interests and at the same time to permit a sufficient volume of imports to satisfy the exporting country."

Now what comes out of all that process that affects you working people and businessmen of Newburgh? I'll take some very specific examples, including woolen textiles. Let me begin with carpets and felt, where I can be brief.

So far as carpets are concerned, I have seen a statement of the Firth Carpet Company of May eighteenth in which they say that tariff rates have already been lowered under the trade agreements negotiated with Turkey, Iran, United Kingdom, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia, "and further reductions will bring imports on goods produced by cheap foreign labor to the detriment of American labor". From this he implies that all these trade agreements damaged the carpet workers in Newburgh. The fact is that the agreements with Turkey and Iran affected only hand-made orientals, which are not in any real sense competitive with American products, especially the Firth Carpet Company.

The Belgian agreement had no important effect. The only agreement which affected the production of the Firth Company was the Czech agreement,

which bound the tariff on Wilton rugs worth less than 40 cents a square yard, and the United Kingdom agreement, which reduced the tariff on Axminster rugs worth more than 40 cents a square yard from 60 percent to 40 percent *ad valorem*.

You should note in the first place that the imports of carpets that are competitive have never been more than a quarter of one percent of our products. So far as the cheaper Wilton rugs are concerned, on which the Czech agreement bound the duty, the imports in 1937 were \$254,000; in 1938, \$102,000; and in 1939, \$212,000 (1938 of course was the recession). So far as the more expensive Axminster rugs are concerned, on which the British agreement cut the duty by one third, the imports in 1937 were \$974; in 1938, \$464; and in 1939, \$1,434. This hardly looks like a flood of imports produced by cheap foreign labor.

American Felt Company does not have much of any competition in wool felts—the imports were only \$22,000 in 1939. The U. K. agreement, effective January 1, 1939 and in operation nine months before the war, reduced the tariff from 35 percent to 30 percent in the cheaper grades, and from 40 percent to 35 percent on the grades worth over \$1.50 a pound.

Tariffs on wool-felt hat bodies, which before the war came in real quantities, mostly from France and Italy, were not reduced by any trade agreement, and not much competition is expected for several years.

One of your important concerns is represented here tonight by Mr. Stroock and by many individual employees, I am sure. You are interested in woolen textiles, which is traditionally a high-tariff business. I don't suppose I am going to persuade any of you who have thought that way for many years, but I am going to give you some facts and tell you why I think you are unduly disturbed about the Doughton bill.

First I want to say that you of Stroock's have done an extremely good war job and you deserve not only great credit for that but full consideration of your future business interests in this situation.

The Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934, but most woolen textiles were not affected by any agreement until the U. K. agreement effective January 1, 1939. It was only in effect nine months before war broke out, but it may be noted that Stroock Company's gross profit between 1937 and 1939 went from \$525,000

in 1937 to \$336,000 in 1938 to \$424,000 in 1939, and its operating profit from \$225,000 to \$62,000 to \$134,000. Those figures of course are not conclusive, but at least the reduction in tariff that took place on January 1, 1939 did not produce a flood of cheap-labor goods that drove the company out of business. Mr. Stroock's answer is that imports in 1938 and 1939 were higher than in any year since 1929. Yet the obvious conclusion is that the recession hit Stroock in 1938, but that he made more money in 1939 than 1938, and I suppose employed more of you in Newburgh in 1939 than he did in 1938. He had made more money still in 1929, and did it with more British imports in that year than at any time since.

Do you know what that adds up to? It adds up to the proposition that your prosperity depends on the prosperity of the kind of people in the United States that buy your woolens, not on the amount of British imports. The amount of British imports depends on exactly the same thing. The prosperity of Stroock's and British woolen people were up and down together. Certainly there are some people who like to sport around in something they can say is "imported". For them price is no factor. But there are plenty who want Stroock's when they get a camel's-hair coat, and if your salesmen are as energetic about selling as Mr. Stroock is in attacking reciprocal-trade agreements they will keep on buying your fine products.

This is not a 75-percent tariff cut. It is an enabling act, not a tariff cut. Only 42 percent of dutiable imports by value have had the full 50-percent cut, and it took nine long years to reach that point. None of your woolen items was cut the full 50 percent. In fact the cuts in the woolen industry range from only 10 percent in the case of those under 80 cents a pound to about 41½ percent in the case of those over \$2 a pound.

Mr. Stroock's answer to that is that it is on the upper brackets that the protective duty is needed, because the finer the woolen, the greater the labor cost. That argument deserves real examination.

The argument assumes the truth of the old-time high-protective claim that the difference in wages is the difference in cost. As soon as you stop to think about it, you can see that the claim just isn't true. In any business the true comparison is the unit cost, in which the cost of labor is of course an important item. But in the part of the woolen business we're talking about, the high-grade stuff you make at Stroock's, it is unfair to make the

comparison on the basis of wage rates alone as Mr. Stroock does. What makes your quality? It is "feel" of the fabric above all, and that means know-how in the combination and finishing of the fine wools you use, not the amount you pay your people in comparison with wages paid in England. I wouldn't say that necessarily for the cheaper grades, but that's why you are still in business—because you have the know-how to produce fine stuff.

The United States has reached the position it has today industrially because of know-how, and it is the greatest exporting nation because of that know-how, even though it has the highest wage standards in the world. They are the highest because our working people are the most productive, and the fact that they are the highest does not prevent us from competing successfully.

But you say textiles are different. Yes, they are different in some ways, and that is why in the U. K. agreement the Government agencies maintained a large degree of protection. But the industry is different in other ways. Until recently it has been backward generally in taking up new methods. I'm not talking about your concerns here, because I don't know about them specifically, but about the industry as a whole. Do you know that there has been no new woolen mill built in the last 25 years? Do you know that until ten years ago your textile-machinery people were well behind the times? Some of the important improvements in textile machinery were made in Japan, which most of us have looked down upon as only imitative, not inventive. Recently a winding machine has been invented which has an r.p.m. that is unbelievable. But there was no American bobbin that could keep up with it. The Japanese had some perfectly beautiful ones. Even machine-tool manufacturers are going into textile machinery. That begins to look like more American initiative and ideas. Is it just an accident that all this began about the time that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed, with the threat, as Mr. Stroock would put it, tariffs might be cut? It may be just chance, but I don't think so.

Mr. Besse, the head of the wool-manufacturers' association, is so worried about this flood of imports that he wants to put a limit on our exports. You may have seen his speech a few weeks back in New York when he was talking about some estimates that have been made of our annual exports after the war, some of them as high as 10

billion dollars a year. That is terrible, he thinks, because he knows that can only be paid for, most of it, by imports. So he wants to limit our exports to 5 billion dollars, the amount in 1929.

Have you ever thought how you limit exports? You can only do it by export licenses. How do you decide which exports can go and which cannot go? Do you want some Government agency to tell you whether you can ship your goods to a place where you have a customer who is able to pay you? Does Mr. Besse want that? Maybe he does if he doesn't export, but just let them tell that to the rest of the citizens who depend on exports in one way or another. The State Department is for getting Government controls off trade, not retaining them. That limitation of exports sounds like the remark of a member of the Ways and Means Committee the other day when I was on the stand, that after England sold looms to Japan, and Japan improved on them and undersold Great Britain, "she tried her best to get these looms out of Japan. Of course she could not do it." Of course not, and that is just another example of this protective mentality. It wasn't protective mentality that sent Yankee traders all around the world in competition with the best they had to give. I'm for protection of our essential industries (and textiles are one), but I'm also for enough outside competition to keep them alert and on their toes, producing at a profit better and better goods by better and better methods for lower prices. You're all consumers just as I am, and you mustn't ever forget that Henry Ford made his money by getting prices down to us, not keeping them up.

But I'm sure you think at this stage that I am just another of those free-trading bureaucrats. Let me go back to what I said about the gradualness with which this authority has been used up in the 11 years. It has not only been used gradually but with real care for you workers in the protected industries. Listen a moment to this list of protective devices.

When we make an agreement, and then generalize it to other countries under our most-favored-nation clause, we provide that if a third country comes in with its imports and gets the major benefit of a concession it can be taken away entirely or limited by a quota. We limit concessions by reclassification, by changing the form of duties, by quotas. We finally devised the escape clause which will be in every new agreement, providing

that if, as a result of unforeseen developments, any article on which we made a concession is being imported in such increased quantities that it threatens domestic producers, we can withdraw or modify the concession at once, after consultation, without having to call off the whole agreement.

So you can all be sure, you workers and you employers, that we are concerned with your problem and that any evidence of that kind of flood which your Orange County Chamber of Commerce wrote about will get quick action.

Let me close by repeating to you that your prosperity in Newburgh and Orange County depends upon high levels of employment in the United States and throughout the world. The war employment has proved that beyond any possibility of a doubt. We are short of meat, for instance, in large part because people are eating lots of meat who ate little meat before, in this country. They are working and they spend better. I am not overlooking the interests of Orange County when I take the broad viewpoint. If we get into another depression, everybody is going to be protecting everything to the hilt. God forbid that we ever get into that kind of a downward spiral again. Our hope is to keep employment up by expanding trade at home and trade abroad. That isn't impossible. It can be done, and a vital, courageous United States is the place to begin and to lead. That doesn't mean taking protection off, and throwing many thousands of people out of work, even if they could get other jobs. We haven't done that, and we are not going to. But this persistent calamity-howling put out by some organizations is one of the dangerous leftovers of isolationism. What we need is old-fashioned American push and ingenuity and inventiveness, and we need it mighty bad. The average number of inventions per capita per year went along at a steady rate in good times and bad, in war and in peace, until 1933. But at the bottom of our depression it went down suddenly and has stayed down. That is a bad sign, but our people are out of that now, and they have the accomplishments of this war under their belts. The world is amazed at what we have done in cooperation with our Allies, the United Nations. The world is wondering, how fearfully, whether we can do it in peace. To that there can only be one answer. We have to straighten out our currency relations with them through the Bretton Woods agreements, and we have to prove our desire to

expand our prosperity and our international trade in a pattern of free enterprise, by passing the Doughton bill.

The following excerpts are from an address that Mr. Taft delivered before the Economic Club of New York in New York City on May 23:

Before an audience like this there is no real necessity to review in detail the Hull reciprocal-trade-agreements program. I would only remind you that it was adopted in part as an alternative to the revision of the Smoot-Hawley tariff act in an effort to develop a new process for tariff-making in the United States. There has been an almost unanimous approval of the reciprocal bargaining method as a process for gradual reduction of tariffs, which at the same time avoids the objectionable types of congressional log-rolling. You will note that the minority of the Ways and Means Committee offered to renew the act for a year without change, and it is probable that a renewal for two years would go through without serious opposition.

The question at issue, therefore, is the request for increased authority, which we advocate, and certain crippling amendments which are proposed by the old-fashioned high-tariff advocates, which we oppose. The protectionists are really against the program but realize it is hopeless to make a frontal attack.

It is not surprising that there should be general approval of the operation of this new idea in tariff-making, because prior to the war 48 countries had given to their executives greater or less power to change tariff rates without the necessity of legislative confirmation, and in a number of others with the parliamentary form of government the legislative approval was a matter of form. Since 1932 the executive in Great Britain has made hundreds of changes in tariff rates, many of them as a result of bargaining agreements with other nations, like Sweden and Denmark.

You will also recall that under the McKinley tariff act of 1890, and the Dingley tariff act of 1897, the United States made 27 executive agreements not subject to approval by the legislature, so that the constitutional argument would seem without validity at this stage. The practice of other nations as well as our own is a strong argument for continuing to operate in this way.

The opposition attempts to distinguish both the early American practice and that of the other

nations by emphasizing what they describe as the evil effects of the unconditional most-favored-nations clause.

As for this provision in the Trade Agreements Act that the benefit of tariff reductions made in our trade agreements shall be extended to all countries which do not discriminate against the imports from this country, the United States has adhered to the policy of unconditional most-favored-nation tariff treatment underlying this provision, because long and general experience has shown it to be the policy most conducive to the liberalization and expansion of international trade on a non-discriminatory basis.

This policy of generalizing trade-agreement concessions has been adversely criticized in some quarters as being poor tariff-bargaining strategy. It is argued that, while an exchange of concessions between the United States and another country may in itself constitute a good bargain, the automatic extension by the United States of its part of the reciprocal concessions to third countries represents a sacrifice of bargaining power which might have been used to secure specific concessions from those countries. In reality, the United States sacrifices nothing.

What happens, in effect, is that the United States exchanges the extension of all its concessions in bulk against the extension to this country in bulk of all the concessions which the various recipient countries have granted or may in future grant to all other countries. Thus the United States, far from giving away benefits without receiving any counterpart, actually secured for itself three important types of direct and specific benefit: (1) the removal of existing discriminations against American trade; (2) the avoidance of retaliation against American trade, which would certainly be provoked by resort, on the part of this country, to either a conditional most-favored-nation policy or a policy of granting exclusive preferences on a bilateral basis; and (3) the automatic extension to American trade of all concessions granted by other countries to one another. These last-mentioned benefits comprise, in total, a number of concessions which is considerably larger than the number granted by this country under the trade-agreements program. Other countries have, of course, been willing to extend their concessions to the United States only in return for the extension of similar unconditional most-favored-nation treatment by this country.

Frequently, moreover, it has been observed that misconceptions as to the real significance of the principle of equality of tariff treatment, in so far as it involves the generalization to third countries of American concessions, are attributable to a faulty or incomplete understanding of actual procedure under the trade-agreements program. Concessions are initially granted by the United States as a general rule to the country which is the principal supplier, or at least a leading supplier, of the product in question. The implication, which usually forms the basis of criticism of the policy of generalizing such concessions, that a concession is of equal value to all countries and that through its extension to third countries the United States is opening its markets to many times the quantity of imports which would be permitted if the concessions were restricted to the agreement country alone, is thus completely erroneous and misleading. Countries which are secondary or minor suppliers do, of course, derive some benefit from the extension of the concession to them, just as we benefit from concessions which they extend to us on products of which the United States is a secondary or minor supplier in their markets.

In addition, safeguards exist which insure that any concession granted in a trade agreement can be either modified so as to reserve the major benefit of it for the party to the agreement originally receiving it or withdrawn in the event that a third country should succeed (contrary to the purpose of the agreement) in obtaining the major benefit. Such provision is contained in article X of the trade agreement with France, which reads as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic reserve the right to withdraw or modify the concession granted on any product under this agreement, or to impose quantitative restrictions on the importation of any such product, if, as a result of the extension of such concession to third countries, such countries obtain the major benefit of such concession and in consequence thereof an unduly large increase in importations of such product takes place"

This provision will continue to be available for use if necessary in the future.

No matter how often the argument against the unconditional most-favored-nation clause is answered, there is constant repetition of the statement that we give away all the benefits of a nego-

tiation to a third country that has done nothing to deserve it, and a constant concealment of the fact that we get more in the way of benefit from the operation of the clause. Let me give you some very specific examples of benefits received from the operation of this policy:

The first reciprocal-trade agreement between the United States and Canada went into effect on January 1, 1936. Under its provisions, Canada applied to imports from the United States the same rates of duty paid by goods from non-British countries with which Canada had most-favored-foreign-nation treaties. These rates, while generally higher than those applicable to the same articles when imported from British countries, were generally lower than the previous rates on imports from the United States. This resulted in immediate duty reductions on United States products covered by about 600 items in the Canadian tariff law, which had accounted for about 30 percent of Canada's total imports from the United States. These duty reductions were in addition to those specified in the agreement itself, and were obtained solely through the most-favored-foreign-nation provision of the agreement.

Peru, before conclusion of the reciprocal-trade agreement with the United States, had accorded preferential and exclusive reductions in import duties on certain goods originating in the United Kingdom, including caustic soda for industrial use; certain iron and steel wire; various textile products, including printed cotton cloth; cotton knit fabrics for clothing and underwear; types of woolen cloth; white, bleached, and printed fabrics made from linen, ramie, and similar textile fibers; artificial-silk yarns for the manufacture of hosiery and fabrics in general; artificial-silk fabrics; and several other products. By virtue of the most-favored-nation provisions of the trade agreement between the United States and Peru, these exclusive concessions to the United Kingdom were generalized to the United States.

Also, before the conclusion of the agreement between the United States and Peru, that country had been granting exclusive concessions to Argentina on wheat, but after the agreement with the United States became effective this discrimination against us in favor of Argentina was removed.

There can be no doubt that attacks on the British are being used to support the opposition to the reciprocal-trade-agreements program, although

not usually in any open or direct statement. So it is that constant reference is made to British Empire preferences. The fact is that in the second agreement with Canada, effective January 1, 1939, with the consent of the United Kingdom, Canada reduced in certain cases the margin of tariff preferences previously guaranteed on imports from the United Kingdom, as compared with imports from the United States.

Before the U. K. trade agreement nearly 50 percent of United States exports to the United Kingdom had been affected adversely by the various restrictions imposed by the U. K.

In the agreement with the United Kingdom, effective January 1, 1939, Great Britain not only reduced its tariff on scheduled items covering the most important United States exports to that country but liberalized its import quotas on meat products important to the United States. It removed entirely its tariffs on wheat and lard from non-British countries and reduced the margin of preference accorded to British-country goods on hundreds of items, both in the United Kingdom market and in the British colonies and possessions.

So much for some of the general arguments.

You are hearing again tonight the general theory of agricultural self-sufficiency and economic isolation for which Mr. Goss, Mr. Sexauer, and Mr. McMillan stand. They have in recent years been absorbed into the American Tariff League, with its fear complex and its resemblance to Cassandra in all but one respect—its prophecies don't happen.

These agricultural protectionists do agree with the rest of us that some crops have benefited from reciprocal-trade agreements, such as apples, citrus fruits, and dried fruits. But they object that this increased export trade brings in goods in payment, for example, in the form of Canadian beef cattle or bacon into markets where they compete with the products of farmers who don't benefit from the export of oranges. Don't they ever stop to figure that California orange ranchers eat meat when they sell their oranges and don't eat it when they don't? Apparently not, but they certainly figure out how many additional acres in the United States might be used to produce that bacon and those cattle. They even figure out "as a matter of interest" how many acres in the United States could be used to produce the weight of cotton similar to that of imported sisal, manila or abacá, kapok, istle or Tampico, orin vegetal, and

coir. They concede that these fibers have distinctive characteristics, so that cotton would not in all respects be a satisfactory substitute. This gem is the product of Mr. Sexauer's department committee on agriculture of the United States Chamber of Commerce. I wish we had known that cotton was in any respect a substitute for sisal or abacá, because it would have saved this Government a good deal of money in its sisal projects in the hemisphere.

There are just a few serious comments I want to make on this theory. The obvious one is that it has no possible economic justification and almost none from the standpoint of national defense.

I won't stop to discuss the general economic theory of exchange of goods before this distinguished audience, which knows it a lot better than I do.

But national defense needs a word and rubber is a good sample to work on. We want available in another war the strategic and critical materials needed for war potential. But they do not need to be available within the United States, and many of them cannot be made available here. They should be available within the shipping lanes adequately protected by our Navy, and from countries on whom we can count as friends. That is part of the reason for maintaining bases in the Pacific.

Mr. McMillan is interested in rubber because its production is dependent upon alcohol, which can be produced either from sugar, wheat, or other agricultural products. But those who discuss rubber as an instance where we need protection and where we should ignore the coolies of Netherlands Indies and Malaya neglect completely the fact that we cannot use synthetic rubber yet without a considerable admixture of crude. Crude rubber is the most serious shortage we have today. With 100,000 tons more of crude per year we could produce 20 percent more tires with the same manpower. Enough is not produced elsewhere in the world to fill the need today. Of course we shall keep the synthetic industry producing or in reserve at least to the degree the military declare it needed for national defense.

But to use national defense as an excuse for economic isolation just leads back to the attitude between nations promoted by the economic warfare of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese. We are

against it, and our people will never stand for it, if they once are shown the speciousness of the appealing arguments in which it is clothed.

This is an argument for preventing the importation of any foreign agricultural products competitive with any here even though limited in amount, because even the small quantities affect the market price. The interest of the consumer, as in some other tariff-protected industries, is ignored.

But the argument goes further. We are to import no more non-competitive items if production of the same or equivalent products can be stimulated here, no matter what the increased cost. They even want to make the soapers use soft oils instead of palm oil and copra. Each country is to take care of itself and its prosperity completely, and worry no longer about its neighbor. It is just a little funny to hear the answers of this same crowd when it is proposed that the South should expand its dairying business in order to improve its agricultural situation. That is, of course, an entirely different matter.

Finally, this whole proposal is selfish and mean, and, like most philosophies of that nature, short-sighted and extremely dangerous in the long run. It is guaranteed to lose us every friend we have abroad, and no nation, however powerful, can afford that luxury.

What is it that the opposition really wants? Let me read you the statement of one of the members of the Ways and Means Committee in cross-examining me on May twelfth, during the hearings:

"What I want to see is to get away from this business of letting a group of exporters and to some extent importers direct the policy of this Government.

"They are pretty clever. Evidently they have found a group who is willing to work with them on this unbalanced economy, which I think is entirely wrong. I believe if this matter were here, handled by Congress, as it should be, it would not result in an unbalanced economy, as it does where a group of internationally minded people down in the State Department are trying to arrange these tariff duties without taking into consideration the problems of the local industries.

"I think I know the situation in my district. I think I could tell whether they were hard-pressed or not. Take, for instance, the cutlery business. We know what is going to happen after this war,

and we know it just as well as you people, or better than you people do in the State Department. But our interest is far greater in seeing that those are not destroyed, because, without those small industries, our communities fold up. And we cannot afford that."

My answer to that position was also given at the hearing and was as follows:

"The fact is that neither this committee nor the House of Representatives nor the Congress of the United States can do any bargaining on tariff rates. You can fix rates, you can fix limits within which bargaining may take place, but I submit to you gentlemen that it is impossible to work out a bargaining with a series of countries through the mechanism of the legislature. That is no reflection on them. They are not set up to do that kind of job. Certainly they should establish the standards within which that bargaining can be done. But the history of executive bargaining, because of that necessity and the nature of things, goes way back, and as you know, as I have stated in other places, it is clearly a nonpartisan position so far as that conclusion is concerned."

However, as I have already said, the major issue in this situation is the need for increased bargaining power.

Signing of Naval-Mission Agreement With Chile

[Released to the press May 24]

In conformity with the request of the Government of Chile there was signed on May 24 by Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, and Arturo Bascuñán, in charge of the Chilean Embassy, an agreement providing for the detail of a naval mission by the United States to serve in Chile.

The agreement will continue in force for three years from the date of signature but may be extended beyond that period at the request of the Government of Chile. The provisions of the agreement are similar in general to provisions contained in other agreements between the United States and certain other American republics providing for the detail of officers of the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to advise the armed forces of those countries.

Arrival of Arthur Schoenfeld In Budapest

[Released to the press May 23]

The Department of State announced that H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, United States Representative in Hungary with the personal rank of Minister, arrived in Budapest on May 11.¹

He will have charge of the protection of American interests and will maintain informal contact with the provisional Hungarian authorities but is not formally accredited to them. When he is in a position to undertake investigations concerning the whereabouts and welfare of American citizens in Hungary further announcement will be made.

Welfare of American Nationals in Finland

[Released to the press May 25]

The State Department announced that the United States Mission at Helsinki is prepared to furnish information concerning the welfare and whereabouts of individual American nationals in Finland. Persons in the United States who wish information concerning friends and relatives who are American nationals in Finland may communicate with the Department of State, which will forward their inquiries to the Mission through official channels.

For the time being this service does not include inquiries or messages sent in behalf of persons who do not possess American nationality.

Transmission of Funds to the Philippines

[Released to the press May 25]

In view of the restoration of normal banking channels for the transmission of private remittances to persons residing in liberated portions of the Philippine Islands, the Department of State announces that it is no longer in a position to accept such funds for transmission to the Philippines through official channels.

Aviation Agreements

[Released to the press May 26]

The following action, not previously announced, has been taken on the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Two Freedoms), and the International Air Transport Agreement (Five Freedoms), which were concluded at the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago on December 7, 1944:

Peru

The Honorable Señor Dr. Eduardo Gerland, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Peru, informed the Acting Secretary of State by a note dated May 4 that by Supreme Resolution issued April 28 the Peruvian Government approved the interim agreement.

Afghanistan

The Minister of Afghanistan informed the Acting Secretary of State by a note dated May 16 that the signature affixed on behalf of Afghanistan to the interim, transit, and transport agreements constitutes an acceptance of those agreements by the Government of Afghanistan. In his note the Minister stated that Afghanistan's contribution to the expenses stipulated in paragraph II of Article 5 of the agreement must be authorized by the law of his country before payment can be effected.

Australia

The Minister of Australia informed the Acting Secretary of State by a note dated May 19 that the signature affixed on behalf of Australia to the interim agreement constitutes an acceptance of the agreement by the Australian Government and an obligation binding upon it.

Mexico

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Mexico informed the Acting Secretary of State by a note dated May 22 that the Government of Mexico accepts the interim agreement and will put it into force provisionally until it is approved by the Senate of the Republic in accordance with Mexican constitutional procedure.

Colombia

Señor Don Alberto Vargas Nariño, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Colombia, signed the interim agreement on May 24.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1945, p. 127.

Jews in Germany, 1933-1939

By CLARENCE B. ODELL and ROBERT H. BILLIGMEIER¹

WITH THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER of Germany one of the major problems confronting Europe concerns the resettlement of peoples scattered throughout the world by the dislocations of war and by the political and religious persecution preceding it. The problem of displaced Jews is an integral part of this general problem of displaced population. Millions of the Jews who have survived the years of persecution before and since the outbreak of war have been forced into exile, have been deported from their home communities to other areas, or were confined in concentration camps and ghettos. The German Government, and to a lesser extent her puppet states and the governments of the satellites associated with her, by their anti-Semitic policies, have caused the displacement of a large portion of the 9 or 10 million Jews living in Europe before the war. The post-war resettlement of Jewish peoples thus scattered constitutes a tremendous problem for those concerned with the post-war adjustment and repatriation or transfer of displaced populations.

The collapse of the National Socialist regime in Germany probably will mean the end of the applied policies of religious and "racial" persecution in Europe. That fact alone, however, will not necessarily make feasible the repatriation of the large numbers of Jews who have fled Germany or who have been deported from that country since 1933.

It is probable that a large number of these exiled persons will not want to return to Germany. A wide-spread reluctance will prevail among them toward returning to the country in which they suffered persecution and discrimination. Many thousands of Jewish refugees have entered the United States, Palestine, and other overseas countries as permanent immigrants. These people have ceased being refugees. Others have found temporary refuge in these countries and a large proportion of these refugees who have found a temporary haven will seek permission to settle permanently in the countries in which they reside, or in other similar areas.

In addition to those individual Jews actually displaced, there will be the problem of extra-European settlement for many Jews, still living in Germany, who may desire to emigrate rather than attempt readjustment in their home communities. Those who have succeeded in establishing themselves in other countries will make efforts to help friends and relatives still in Germany or subjected areas emigrate after the conclusion of hostilities. Economic dislocations will further tend to accelerate emigration from Germany. An undetermined number of Jews undoubtedly will remain in Germany or will return there as soon as the discriminatory laws have been abolished, but their numbers probably will be small.

The latest reliable data on the number and distribution of Jews in Germany are based on the census of 1939. The value of the German census material of 1939 concerning both confessional Jews and "racial Jews" lies in the fact that it gives an indication of the displacement of German Jews between 1933 and 1939. No reliable data are available on the number of Jews in Germany who have been put to death by the Nazis since 1939. Little is accurately known concerning the number of those who have fled persecution, who have been transported to other areas of Europe, or who have been placed in concentration camps. Consequently, there is little indication of how many Jews remain in the Reich. The 1939 census provides a basis from which to proceed in the study of subsequent movements of Jewish peoples in Germany since that date.

Jews in the German Reich, 1933-1939

In 1933 and 1939 statistics on religious affiliations of the German people were compiled as a

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part of the general population censuses taken in those years. In addition, an attempt was made in 1939 to enumerate Jews in Germany not only by confession but also by "race".

Germany

According to the census of 1933, there were 721,612 confessional Jews in Germany, which represented 0.94 percent of the total German population.² Approximately 7 percent of the Jews in Europe (including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) lived within the confines of Germany. In May 1939 there were 307,614 religious Jews living in Germany, 413,998 fewer than were reported in the country by the census of 1933.³ Thus, in the six years of the National Socialist regime the Jewish population had declined 57 percent. In the area of Germany proper (*altes Reichsgebiet*⁴) there were 502,799 confessional Jews in 1933; by 1939 the number had decreased to 221,332, a loss of 56 percent in six years.

GERMANY: RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION, 1933-1939⁵

German Reich*	1939		1933†		Change, 1933-1939	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	79,375,281	100.0	76,439,450	100.0	2,935,831	3.8
Protestant	43,056,830	54.2	41,629,348	54.5	1,426,482	3.4
Roman Catholic	31,943,932	40.3	31,077,233	40.7	866,699	2.8
Jews	307,614	0.4	721,612	0.9	-413,998	-57.4
Other non-Christians	86,423	0.1	100,402	0.2	-13,979	-46.1
Others	3,953,898	5.0	2,787,352	3.6	1,166,546	41.9
Unknown	27,584	0.0	63,503	0.1	-35,919	-56.6

*Reich area as of the date of the census, May 17, 1939, excluding Memelland, Danzig, and Polish areas.

†For the *altes Reichsgebiet* according to census of 1933; for Saarland, the census of 1935; for Austria, the census of 1934; and for Sudetenland, the Czechoslovak census of 1930.

² Reich area as of 1930 (excluding Memelland, Danzig, and Polish areas). Figures for Germany are based on the census of 1933; for Saarland, 1935; for Austria, 1934; for Sudetenland, 1930. No attempt is made here to evaluate that part of the intercensal change in the numbers of confessional Jews which could be ascribed to differences in the method of enumeration or to the increased reluctance at the later census to admit adherence to the Jewish religion.

³ "Die Religionsgliederung der Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs, 1939," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 9, May 1, 1941.

⁴ The *altes Reichsgebiet* represents the 1933 area of Germany with the addition of the Saarland.

⁵ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 9, May 1, 1941.

Austria

The decrease in the number of Jews in Austria after the *Anschluss* was even more spectacular than that which occurred in Germany proper. After the German annexation of Austria, the highly developed anti-Jewish program was extended to Austria, and a mass migration of Jews out of the country began. In his book, *The Refugee Problem*, Sir John Hope Simpson writes, "The effect [of the anti-Jewish measures] was more catastrophic than in Germany, because a process spread over five years in Germany was carried out in a few months in Austria. The whole programme, built up by a series of administrative and legal measures in Germany, was applied at one blow to Austria." In a little more than a year the Jewish population in Austria decreased to 84,213, a number 110,775 less than what it had been in 1934 (according to the census held March 22 of that year), representing a loss of 56.8 percent.

Sudetenland

An even greater relative decrease of Jewish population was experienced in the Sudetenland. In this area the Jews decreased by 21,756 between 1930 and 1939, which constituted a loss of 93 percent of the total Jewish population. At the time of the German occupation of Sudetenland, there was a mass migration of Jews to other parts of Czechoslovakia. This migration was facilitated by the absence of frontier restrictions which in other areas had considerably impeded the movement of refugees. By the time of the census of May 1939 only 1,638 confessional Jews were reported living in the Sudetenland.

Jews—By "Race" and Religion

In the religious census of 1939 only those who were confessional Jews were enumerated as Jews. According to National Socialist doctrine, however, the quality of being Jewish is a matter of "race" as well as of religion, and anti-Jewish measures are applied to people not adherents of the Jewish religion who are considered "racially Jewish" or of partly Jewish origin. Thus in the German census of 1939 an attempt was made to enumerate the Jewish population according to National Socialist concepts of race. The "racial" categories used in the census, admittedly rough, were wholly based upon what the Germans responsible for the "racial" enumeration termed *blutmä-*

sige Zugehörigkeit, i.e. membership in a "racial" or "blood" community.⁶ Three categories of Jews were established: (1) full Jews were defined as those individuals with at least three Jewish grandparents (*Grosselternsteile*); (2) the "hybrids" first class were defined as those who had two Jewish grandparents; and (3) those having only one Jewish grandparent were considered "hybrids" second class. In the text accompanying the census tables the German authors use the term "Jews" to include only the persons in the first category and not the "hybrids."

According to the "racial" enumeration in 1939 based on these categories, there were 330,892 persons listed as "fully Jewish" in "racial" origin; 72,738 were listed as "hybrids" of the first class; and 42,811 "hybrids" of the second class were reported. In the census of religions only 307,614 persons were enumerated as confessional Jews. Thus there were 7 percent fewer confessional Jews than there were persons of wholly Jewish "racial" origin. To carry the comparison further, only 68.9 percent of the 446,441 Jews and "hybrids" were enumerated as confessional Jews.

"RACIAL JEWS" IN THE GERMAN REICH, 1939

Area	Number	Percent of total population
German Reich	330,892	0.42
Germany (<i>altes Reichsgebiet</i>) . . .	233,973	0.34
Austria	94,270	1.42
Sudetenland	2,649	0.07

In Germany proper (*altes Reichsgebiet*) there were 233,973 "fully Jewish" persons enumerated in the "racial" census of 1939; in Austria there were 94,270; and in the Sudetenland 2,649.

Distribution of Jews by Size of Community

The Jews in Germany, as in other countries of Europe and in the Americas, are predominantly urban. In 1939 less than 10 percent of the "racially

⁶ "Die Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge im Deutschen Reich", *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 5/6, March 1940, p. 84. See also "Reichsbürgergesetz vom 14. November 1935", *Reichsgesetzbuch* I. S. 1333.

⁷ "Die Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge", as above cited, p. 85. The last column represents the percentage of Jews in the total population of each of the community classes.

Jewish" population in Germany lived in communities with less than 10,000 inhabitants. In contrast, 50 percent of the total German population lived in such communities.

The Jews are largely concentrated in the more important urban centers of the Reich. More than 80 percent of the "fully Jewish" people were found in the large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Significantly, a much smaller proportion of the German people as a whole, 30 percent of them, were living in such cities.

The Jews formed a larger proportion of the total urban population than of the rural population; and larger urban centers had higher proportions of Jews than the smaller cities. Jews constituted an average of 0.36 percent of the population of cities between 100,000 and 500,000; 0.87 percent of the population of cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000; and 2.31 percent of the population of cities of over 1,000,000.

The concentration of Jews in a few large communities is a recent phenomenon. In 1871, not quite one fifth of the confessional Jews in Germany (*altes Reichsgebiet*) lived in the large cities over 100,000. In 1900 almost one half lived in the large urban centers, and by 1933 more than seven tenths lived in such communities. Since 1933 the proportion of Jews living in the large cities has increased to more than four-fifths (82.3 percent among "racial Jews").

Among the "hybrids" the proportion of urban dwellers is only slightly less than that existing among the "fully Jewish" people. Of the persons included in the first group of "hybrids" 77.7 percent lived in cities over 100,000; in the second and less Jewish group of "hybrids" 70.6 percent lived in these large communities.

GERMANY: "RACIAL JEWS" BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY, 1939⁷

Size of community	Number	Percent of Jewish population	Percent of total population
Total	330,892	100.0	0.42
Less than 10,000	30,337	9.2	0.08
10,000 to 19,999	6,828	2.0	0.14
20,000 to 49,999	10,803	3.3	0.17
50,000 to 99,999	10,661	3.2	0.26
100,000 and over	272,263	82.3	1.13
100,000 to 499,999	37,031	11.2	0.36
500,000 to 999,999	50,833	15.4	0.87
1,000,000 and over	184,399	55.7	2.31

The concentration of Jews is especially evident in cities over 500,000. More than 70 percent of all German Jews live in the 12 German cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants. In these communities the Jews represent 1.7 percent of the population, or four times more than their relative proportion in the total population of the Reich. Even among these 12 large cities there was a pronounced concentration of Jewish people. Wien (Vienna) and Berlin together held more than half of all the Jews in Germany. On the other hand, excluding Wien and Berlin, only five cities had a Jewish population greater than 5,000.


DISTRIBUTION OF JEWS AND "JEWISH HYBRIDS" IN GERMAN CITIES OVER 500,000 IN 1939^a


Group	Jews	"Jewish hybrids", first class	"Jewish hybrids", second class
Total	223,621	44,297	22,052
Wien	91,480	15,591	6,753
Berlin	82,788	17,820	8,854
Frankfurt-am-Main	14,461	1,879	857
Breslau	11,172	1,727	776
Hamburg	10,131	4,428	3,360
Köln	8,539	1,507	828
München	5,050	1,345	624

^a Above cited.

In the seven cities listed above lived more than two thirds of the Jews in Germany, three fifths of the mixed group first class, and over half of the second "hybrid" group. Other large cities with more than 2,000 Jews were Leipzig (4,477); Mannheim (3,024); and Nürnberg (2,688). Fifteen others had from 1,000 to 2,500 Jewish inhabitants.

Considering the cities individually, Wien had the largest proportion of Jews in its population, 4.76 percent. Frankfurt-am-Main ranked second with a Jewish population representing 2.61 percent of its inhabitants. The proportion of "racial Jews" in the total population of Berlin was 1.91 percent and in Breslau 1.77 percent. The cities of Beuthen, Köln (Cologne), Mannheim, and Würzburg had a Jewish population of more than one percent of their respective total population, all other cities had less than one percent. In contrast,





in 1936 the confessional Jews represented 28 percent of the population of New York City. There were almost 7 times as many Jews in New York City in 1937 as there were in all of Germany in 1939.

Although it is true that the Jewish population of the Reich was concentrated largely in the great urban centers, no German city had so large a Jewish population as such European cities as Lódz, London, Moskva (Moscow), Budapest, or Warszawa (Warsaw), or New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia in the United States. The Jewish population of Germany is not nearly so localized as in England where it is estimated that 90 percent of the English Jews live in the two cities of London and Manchester. Considering Austria independently there is, however, a similar concentration, for 97.4 percent of Austrian Jews lived in Wien in 1939.

Although the proportion of confessional Jews of the Reich proper⁹ living in Berlin increased from 1.6 percent to 35.9 percent between 1816 and 1939, the proportion of Jews in the total population of the city was lower in 1939 than at any time since 1825. In 1880 the proportion of confessional Jews in Berlin reached 4.2 percent, the highest proportion recorded in the 12 intervening censuses between 1816 and 1939. Similarly, the number of confessional Jews in Germany, in relation to the total population, was highest in 1880, and since that date the proportion has declined in each succeeding census.

CONFESSITIONAL JEWS IN BERLIN, 1816 TO 1939¹⁰

Year	Population	Number	Confessional Jews percent of Berlin population	Percent of Jewish population in Ger- many
1816	223,000	3,400	1.54	1.6
1825	251,000	4,200	1.68	1.7
1834	301,000	5,600	1.85	2.1
1843	401,000	8,600	2.14	2.8
1852	511,000	12,300	2.41	3.8
1861	613,000	19,400	3.17	5.5
1871	932,000	36,500	3.92	9.6
1880	1,321,000	55,100	4.18	12.7
1890	1,960,000	82,600	4.21	17.9
1900	2,712,000	109,400	4.03	22.2
1910	3,734,000	144,000	3.86	26.9
1925	4,024,000	172,700	4.29	30.6
1933	4,243,000	160,600	3.78	32.0
1939	4,321,521	78,713	1.80	35.9

At one time the proportion of confessional Jews in the total population of several of the major cities of Germany was much higher. In 1871, 11 percent of the population of Frankfurt-am-Main were confessional Jews; 7.9 percent of the inhabitants of Mannheim and 6.7 percent of Breslau were Jewish. Although the Jewish communities in these cities have increased numerically since then, the proportions they bore to the total population have decreased significantly.

CONFESSITIONAL JEWS IN SELECTED CITIES OF GERMANY, 1871, 1933, AND 1939¹¹

Cities	1939		1933		1871	
	Num- ber	Percent of pop- ulation	Num- ber	Percent of pop- ulation	Num- ber	Percent of pop- ulation
Total	135,979	1.27	278,151	2.80	85,599	4.36
Percent of total con- fessional Jews of Reich	61.3	55.3	22.3
Berlin	78,713	1.82	160,564	3.78	36,021	4.36
Breslau	10,741	1.73	20,202	3.23	13,916	6.69
Düsseldorf	1,831	0.34	5,053	1.01	919	1.32
Frankfurt-am-Main	13,839	2.52	26,158	4.71	10,009	10.99
Hamburg	8,438	0.50	16,885	1.50	11,954	5.00
Köln	8,000	1.04	14,816	1.96	3,172	2.45
Leipzig	4,284	0.61	11,564	1.62	1,739	1.63
Mannheim	2,986	1.07	6,402	2.33	3,135	7.92
München	4,535	0.56	9,005	1.22	2,903	1.71
Nürnberg	2,611	0.62	7,502	1.83	1,831	2.20

From religious census data for the years 1933 and 1939 it is evident that the flight of Jews from Germany in the intervening six years was extremely heavy, and that the out-migration from the Reich was drawn with remarkable evenness from all sizes of communities. The movement of Jews from the major cities of Germany was only slightly less than the exodus from the smaller urban communities of the Reich. The Jewish population in cities over 100,000 declined 52.5 percent in the six years; the Jewish communities in 11 cities of Germany proper with over 500,000 inhabitants declined 52.2 percent in the intercensal

* Including Saarland. The figures for 1816 have been adjusted to the 1933 area of Germany.

* Statistisches Reichsamt, "Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnisse der Volkszählung, 1933", *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 451, Heft 5; and "Die Bevölkerung des Reichs . . . nach der Religionszugehörigkeit . . . 17. Mai 1939", *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 9, May 1, 1941.

" Statistisches Reichsamt, above cited; and "Die Bevölkerung des Reichs", above cited.

period. The migration of confessional Jews from cities under 100,000 and from rural areas represented a loss of 65.8 percent.

Sex Distribution of Jews and "Jewish Hybrids"

Among the "racial Jews" resident in the Reich in 1939, females were far more numerous than males both in the Jewish and "hybrid" populations. There was also an excess of females manifest in the German population as a whole in 1939, but the disparity in the numbers of the two sexes was much less pronounced.

Among the 330,892 so-called "racial Jews" there were 73 males to 100 females, and exactly the same sex ratio existed among the 307,614 confessional Jews. In the total population of Germany a ratio of 94 males to 100 females was recorded. Although the "Jewish hybrid" population also was predominantly female, the sex ratios of the two "hybrid" groups more nearly approximated the ratio existing in the national population. There were 88 males to 100 females among the "hybrids" of the first class, and a ratio of 93 existed among the people of the second "hybrid" group, which included those with less "Jewish blood".

GERMANY: SEX RATIOS IN THE JEWISH POPULATION, 1939¹²


Group	Males	Females	Ratio of males to 100 females
Total	194,497	251,497	77.2
Jews	139,833	191,059	73.2
"Hybrids", first class . . .	34,010	38,728	87.8
"Hybrids", second class . . .	20,654	22,157	93.2

In 1933 there was an excess of females among the confessional Jews, but the disproportion was far less significant than it was in 1939. It is evident that the migration of Jews from the Reich in the six intervening years was sex-selective, that is, more males than females fled from Nazi persecution. It also is probable that Jewish males have suffered more from physical violence under the National Socialists.

Age and Fertility

In 1933 the Jewish population of Germany was an old population, that is, a relatively large proportion of the Jews had passed through the most

productive ages and had entered the ages of high mortality. The age structure of the Jews, according to 1933-census data, reflected the low fertility that existed at that time and the low fertility and mortality which had persisted over an extended period of time among the Jews in Germany. The German age pyramid itself shows a declining proportion of people in the younger ages, but the aging of the Jewish population began earlier and has proceeded to a far greater degree. A relatively smaller proportion of the Jewish population was included in



Prepared in the Department of State, Division of Geography and Cartography, May 1945 16746

the years of childhood and young adulthood: 30 percent of the German population was under 20 years of age in 1933, whereas only 22 percent of the Jewish population was less than 20 years old. On the other hand 10.1 percent of the Jewish population was 65 years of age and over, although only 6.6 percent of the total Reich population was above that age. Thus, the age profile of the Jewish por-

¹² "Die Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge", as above cited, p. 84.

tion of the German population differed significantly from that of the German population as a whole.

One measure of the relative fertility of the two population groups can be gained by comparing the number of children under 5 to women in the child-bearing ages. In 1933 the ratio of children under 5 to 1,000 women 15 to 44 was 188 among the Jews, and 327 in the total German population. A larger proportion of Jewish women had passed through the reproductive years of their lives, a fact which had significant implications for the crude birth rates in the years following 1933.

Differences in the marriage rates were not factors in fertility differentials between the Jews and the general German population. There were, however, significant differences in marital fertility between the two population groups. Childless marriages and small families were far more characteristic of the Jewish population than of the German population as a whole. Among the Jews 23.8 percent of the married women were childless whereas only 19.9 percent of married females in the total German population were childless in 1933. Similarly, there were significant differences in size of families: A much lower proportion of Jewish women had large families and single-child families were far more numerous among the Jews. Only 6.3 percent of married Jewish women had five or more children in contrast to 16.7 percent among German women in the total population of the Reich.

There is no doubt that Jewish fertility declined further between 1933 and 1939. Certainly the incentives for large families extended to parents by the German Government were not extended to the Jews. The persecution and discrimination focused on the Jews doubtlessly resulted in further depressing the already low Jewish birth rates. Apart from these considerations, with such a small proportion of the female population in the reproductive ages, a decline in the Jewish population, and its relative proportion to the German population, would have been inevitable unless there had been radical changes in fertility patterns.

Occupational Distribution

As a group the confessional Jews in Germany differed significantly from the German population as a whole in the nature of their employment. According to the occupational data contained in

the 1933 census, the confessional Jews in Germany were engaged largely in trade and commerce: 147,000 Jews representing 61.3 percent of all occupied Jews were engaged in trade and commerce in contrast to 18.4 percent among the total occupied population of the Reich. Thus, 2.5 percent of all persons in trade and commerce were Jews whereas they represented only 0.7 percent of all occupied persons. In proportion a higher percentage of Jews was engaged in public service and private professions than the percentage of the total population: 12.5 percent among the Jews and 8.4 percent for the Reich as a whole. Only 1.7 percent of the Jews were engaged in agriculture and forestry, however, while the corresponding figure of the total population was 28.9. Fewer Jews were engaged in manufacture and handicrafts (23.1 percent) than the national average (40.4 percent).

OCCUPATIONS OF CONFESSIONAL JEWS IN GERMANY, 1933¹³

Occupations	Total occupied persons of Germany *		Occupied confessional Jews	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total Occupied Persons	32,296,074	100.0	240,457	100.0
Agriculture and forestry	9,342,785	28.9	4,167	1.7
Industry and handicraft	13,052,982	40.4	55,655	23.1
Trade and commerce	5,932,060	18.4	147,314	61.3
Public service and private professions	2,698,656	8.4	29,974	12.5
Household services	1,260,582	3.9	3,377	1.4

* Area of Germany in 1933.

There are some unfortunate gaps in the statistics of the Jewish population of Germany; one of them is the lack of occupational data for the Jews in the census of 1939. This material would be significant in revealing one part of the impact of the National Socialist regime on German Jewry.

Summary

The problem of the displaced Jewish population of Europe is only a relatively small part of the larger problem of the displaced population of the European continent, but it is a matter of international importance and concern. For that reason an attempt has been made here to relate

¹³ Statistisches Reichsamt, "Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnisse der Volkszählung, 1933", Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 451, Heft 5.

GERMANY: DISTRIBUTION OF JEWS AND "JEWISH HYBRIDS," 1939¹⁴

Area (Germany as of May 17, 1939)	Jews			"Jewish hybrids," class 1			"Jewish hybrids," class 2		
	Number	Percent of total Jews	Percent of total population	Number	Percent of total "hybrids" 1	Percent of total population	Number	Percent of total "hybrids" 2	Percent of total population
Germany	330,892	100.0	0.42	72,738	100.0	0.09	42,811	100.0	0.05
Ostpreussen*	3,178	1.0	0.13	729	1.0	0.03	468	1.1	0.02
Stadt Berlin	82,788	25.0	1.91	17,820	24.5	0.41	8,854	20.7	0.20
Mark Brandenburg	3,769	1.1	0.13	1,652	2.3	0.05	1,218	2.9	0.04
Pommern	3,329	1.0	0.14	816	1.1	0.03	595	1.4	0.02
Schlesien	17,257	5.2	0.35	3,149	4.3	0.06	1,935	4.5	0.04
Sachsen (Provinz)	2,699	0.8	0.07	1,329	1.8	0.04	960	2.2	0.03
Schleswig-Holstein	760	0.2	0.05	443	0.6	0.03	432	1.0	0.03
Hannover	5,894	1.8	0.17	1,439	2.0	0.04	1,117	2.6	0.03
Westfalen	7,843	2.4	0.15	1,733	2.4	0.03	1,388	3.2	0.03
Hessen-Nassau	21,541	6.5	0.80	2,824	3.9	0.11	1,664	3.9	0.06
Rheinprovinz	25,271	7.6	0.32	5,074	7.0	0.06	3,551	8.3	0.04
Hohenzoll Lande	184	0.1	0.25	6	0.0	0.01	20	0.1	0.03
Preussen*	174,513	52.7	0.42	37,014	50.9	0.09	22,202	51.9	0.05
Bayern	16,459	5.0	0.20	3,270	4.5	0.04	2,015	4.7	0.02
Sachsen	7,801	2.4	0.15	2,722	3.7	0.05	1,766	4.1	0.03
Württemberg	4,780	1.4	0.16	842	1.2	0.03	509	1.2	0.02
Baden	9,263	2.8	0.37	1,189	1.6	0.05	627	1.5	0.03
Thüringen	1,958	0.6	0.11	471	0.7	0.03	420	1.0	0.02
Hessen	5,876	1.8	0.40	908	1.3	0.06	617	1.4	0.04
Hansstadt Hamburg	10,131	3.1	0.59	4,428	6.1	0.26	3,360	7.9	0.20
Mecklenburg	341	0.1	0.04	325	0.5	0.04	327	0.8	0.04
Oldenburg	336	0.1	0.06	160	0.2	0.03	175	0.4	0.03
Braunschweig	501	0.2	0.09	219	0.3	0.04	232	0.5	0.04
Bremen	722	0.2	0.17	398	0.6	0.10	336	0.8	0.08
Anhalt	391	0.1	0.09	200	0.3	0.05	191	0.5	0.04
Lippe	224	0.1	0.12	47	0.1	0.03	42	0.1	0.02
Schaumburg-Lippe	187	0.0	0.26	13	0.0	0.02	10	0.0	0.02
Saarland	564	0.2	0.07	240	0.3	0.03	190	0.4	0.02
Reichsgau Wien	91,480	27.6	4.76	15,591	21.4	0.81	6,753	15.8	0.35
Reichsgau Niederdonau	1,971	0.6	0.12	1,115	1.5	0.07	645	1.5	0.04
Reichsgau Oberdonau	251	0.1	0.02	468	0.6	0.05	306	0.7	0.03
Reichsgau Steiermark	568	0.2	0.05	508	0.7	0.05	441	1.0	0.04
Reichsgau Kärnten	60	0.0	0.01	129	0.1	0.03	124	0.3	0.03
Reichsgau Salzburg	67	0.0	0.03	123	0.2	0.05	83	0.2	0.03
Reichsgau Tirol/Vorarlberg	157	0.0	0.08	172	0.2	0.04	139	0.3	0.03
Reichsgau Sudetenland	2,341	0.7	0.08	2,186	3.0	0.07	1,301	3.0	0.04

*Not including Memelland.

what recent reliable data there are available on that problem. The German censuses of 1933 and 1939 present some significant statistical facts concerning the Jewish population of the Reich before the outbreak of the war. These facts describe

¹⁴ Source: "Die Religionsgliederung der Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs, 1939", *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 9, May 1, 1941.

"See "Aliens in Germany, 1939", *BULLETIN* of Feb. 4, 1945, p. 164; and "Displaced Populations in Europe in 1944 With Particular Reference to Germany", *BULLETIN* of Mar. 25, 1945, p. 491.

their numbers by "race" and confession, their geographical distribution, the proportion of urban to rural dwellers, their occupations, and the number of aliens and native-born among them.¹⁵ In addition the data give some indication of the nature of Jewish migration from the Reich in the first six years of the National Socialist regime.

Six years have elapsed since the census enumeration of 1939. The second six years of the National Socialist regime in Germany were doubt-

lessly marked by further profound changes in the numbers and distribution of Jews in the Reich. Unfortunately, there is little reliable information concerning the changes occurring in the second pe-

riod, but what we know about the changes between 1933 and 1939 have importance in relation to the post-war problems of Jewish adjustment and resettlement.

GERMANY: JEWS AND "JEWISH HYBRIDS" BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY, 1939¹⁶

Size of community	Total population (Wohnbevölkerung)		Jews		"Jewish hybrids", class 1		"Jewish hybrids", class 2				
	Number	Per- cent	Number	Per- cent	Per- cent of total pop- ulation	Number	Per- cent	Per- cent of total pop- ulation	Number	Per- cent	Percent of total popula- tion
Total	79,364,408	100.0	330,892	100.0	0.42	72,738	100.0	0.09	42,811	100.0	0.05
Less than 10,000	39,975,557	50.4	30,337	9.2	0.08	7,901	10.9	0.02	6,744	15.8	0.02
10,000 to 19,999	4,873,143	6.2	6,828	2.0	0.14	2,042	2.8	0.04	1,540	3.6	0.03
20,000 to 49,999	6,372,201	8.0	10,803	3.3	0.17	3,541	4.9	0.06	2,446	5.7	0.04
50,000 to 99,999	4,154,011	5.2	10,661	3.2	0.26	2,730	3.7	0.07	1,851	4.3	0.04
100,000 and over	23,989,496	30.2	272,263	82.3	1.13	56,524	77.7	0.24	30,230	70.6	0.13
100,000 to 499,999	10,149,065	12.8	37,031	11.2	0.36	8,919	12.3	0.09	6,202	14.5	0.06
500,000 to 999,999	5,868,431	7.4	50,833	15.4	0.87	9,766	13.4	0.17	5,061	11.8	0.09
1,000,000 and over	7,972,000	10.0	184,399	55.7	2.31	37,839	52.0	0.47	18,967	44.3	0.24

United States Military Mission in Guatemala

[Released to the press May 21]

The State Department announced that an agreement was signed on Monday, May 21, 1945, at 3:30 p.m., by Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, and Enrique López-Herrarte, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Republic of Guatemala in Washington, which, in accordance with the request of the Guatemalan Government, provides for the detail of a military mission by the United States to serve in Guatemala.

The agreement will continue in force for four years from the date of signature, but may be extended beyond that period at the request of the Government of Guatemala. The provisions of the agreement are similar in general to provisions contained in other agreements between the United States and certain other American republics providing for the detail of officers of the United States Army or Navy to advise the armed forces of those countries.

¹⁶ Compiled from source cited for preceding table.

Provisional Commercial Agreements

Egypt-United Kingdom; Egypt-Eire

The American Legation at Cairo reported in a despatch dated April 19, 1945 that the provisional commercial agreement originally concluded between Egypt and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by an exchange of notes dated June 5 and June 7, 1930, and since renewed annually, has been extended for another year to February 16, 1946 under the same conditions.

The extension became effective in Egypt by virtue of a Royal Decree dated April 3, 1945, the text of which was published in *Journal Officiel*, No. 59 of April 9, 1945.

The same issue of the *Journal Officiel* published the text of another Royal Decree, also dated April 3, 1945, extending for another year, to February 16, 1946, the provisional commercial agreement originally concluded between Egypt and Eire by an exchange of notes dated July 25 and July 28, 1930, and since renewed annually.

The Foreign Economic Policy of the State Department

Address by ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLAYTON¹

[Released to the press May 21]

The tragic drama now gripping the world is more than a world war: it is a world revolution.

There is at issue something far more elemental than any mere political, social, or economic problem could ever be.

That issue is simply this:

Nations must learn to live together cooperatively for their mutual security and prosperity; otherwise, civilization will be utterly destroyed and man will return to the dark ages.

This is the law of the machine.

Man created the machine to lessen his burden in supplying the necessities of life.

In doing this, the machine has enormously multiplied man's wants.

These ever-increasing wants make man more and more dependent upon other men, and nations more and more dependent upon all other nations.

One machine calls for another machine and another, and so it will be until the end of time.

Under the impact of the machine, the world continues to shrink rapidly; there is no such thing as isolation, and man now easily destroys in a few days what it took him centuries to build. What new hellish instrument of destruction tomorrow may bring forth no man knows.

The machine can set us free; or, uncontrolled, it can and will destroy us.

To control the machine, we must first learn to control ourselves.

Man lived in isolation and independence over such great reaches of time that it is with the greatest difficulty that his mental and spiritual concepts are adjusted to the condition of dependence which the machine and modern civilization impose.

Out in San Francisco, we are trying to set up the framework of an organization within which rules may be written to guide men in their cooperative efforts to build a new world on the foundations of peace and prosperity.

¹ Delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, in Detroit, Mich., on May 21, 1945.

The delegates there and the peoples for whom they speak know that victory in this war will not bring enduring peace but only the opportunity to work for enduring peace. They know, too, as their predecessors of 25 years ago failed to realize, that the most elaborate arrangements for the maintenance of political and military peace will soon disintegrate if the world again engages in the type of economic warfare it waged between the two world wars.

Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table.

The peace structure has to be seen as a great arch supported by two strong columns, one political and the other economic.

If either column gives way, the whole structure falls.

While the delegates of 49 countries at San Francisco work to set up this Organization, a struggle is going on in Washington to prevent our own country from retracking the same tragic path of economic nationalism which we followed after the first World War with such disastrous results.

There are two, and only two, roads open to us in shaping our economic policies in the post-war world.

We can follow the path of economic liberalism, in keeping with our democratic principles and traditions, and without which no peace structure will long stand, or we can take that same road we followed in the 1920's—the road to economic nationalism, restrictionism, and regimentation, leading inevitably to international irritations and retaliation and the creation of an atmosphere in which the seeds of conflict are sown.

It is impossible to stand still, even if we wished: the world is moving much too fast for that now.

In the State Department, we have planted our feet firmly on the road of economic liberalism, and that's the road we propose to follow.

Our foreign economic policy revolves around the conception of an expanded world economy—free and equal access for all nations to the trade and raw materials of the world, increased produc-

tion, much greater exchange of goods and services between nations, increased consumption, and higher levels of living for all peoples everywhere.

Now, there is not one single element of the "Santa Claus" philosophy in this policy.

On the contrary, quite aside from the question of future peace, the United States will be one of its principal beneficiaries.

Next to this problem of future peace and security, the post-war problem which concerns the greatest number of people in the United States is the problem of employment.

As you know so well here in this great industrial city of Detroit, we have enormously increased our productive capacity during the war, especially in capital and producers' goods—machinery, equipment, tools, and technical knowledge. This productive capacity is now far beyond our domestic requirements.

If we are to reach a satisfactory level of post-war employment, we must find markets abroad for this surplus production.

The markets are there all right in almost unlimited volume.

Many nations require enormous quantities of goods of this character in order to repair their war-devastated areas.

Other nations require the same type of goods in order to develop their resources.

It is definitely in our interest to assist these countries to reconstruct and develop, because we cannot long expect to have a high level of employment and prosperity in our own country if the rest of the world is in the throes of unemployment and depression.

Moreover, we should not forget that our best markets are in the industrially developed countries of the world, because it is in such countries that we find the highest standard of living and the greatest buying power.

To sum up: We have the goods for sale, and there are buyers who must have these goods; the problem is to find the dollars with which to make payment.

In the final analysis, our customers must pay in their own goods and services, but this will not be possible for several years for the obvious reason that they will first have to restore and develop their productive facilities before they can produce a surplus over and beyond their own requirements.

One means of payment will be provided through the facilities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. I would like to tell you something about this institution and the International Monetary Fund.

A bill is now before the Congress to authorize our Government to join in the formation of these two institutions.

As you know, proposals for the Bank and the Fund were agreed upon at Bretton Woods last summer by delegates from all of the 44 United and Associated Nations.

The International Monetary Fund is designed to prevent a recurrence of one of the worst forms of international economic warfare so generally practiced in the period between the two world wars.

I refer to the manipulation of currencies, exchange discriminations and restrictions, and competitive devaluation of exchanges in an effort to gain an unfair advantage in international trade.

The International Monetary Fund is designed to prevent this type of economic warfare.

Members of the Fund agree to define their money in terms of gold, and to keep their money within one percent of its defined value. They also agree to avoid exchange restrictions and to consult with the Fund whenever they consider a change in the value of their currency necessary.

This agreement forms the basic elements of stability and provides the rules of the game. Countries which join the Fund agree that they will abide by the rules and will act together for the common good.

The agreement provides that each member shall pay into the Fund a certain amount of its own currency and a smaller amount of gold. A member of the Fund is enabled to purchase from the Fund with its own currency the currency of another member.

In essence, the Fund is a common effort by the nations which subscribe to it to put aside practices which are destructive of others and of the common good of all, and to provide the means which make that possible. No nation has more to gain from such a result than our own.

The International Monetary Fund promotes collective security because it seeks to establish order in the financial and economic fields, and order in those fields cannot be divorced from order elsewhere.

The second institution proposed at Bretton Woods is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Bank will facilitate investments and productive enterprises where they are needed. This does not mean that the Bank will supersede private lending.

In the normal case, a country will borrow from private bankers, but where private banks, because of the risk, cannot make the loan upon terms which are possible for the borrower both borrower and lender may need the assistance of the International Bank.

The Bank's function will be to investigate the soundness of the projects for which capital is desired, and, provided they are sound, it will guarantee the loans made by private banks. It will also require the Government of the country in which the money is to be used to guarantee the loan.

There are other means, such as the Export-Import Bank, of financing our excess of exports over imports, which it is estimated may reach very large totals in the first five or six years after the war.

In all probability our total investments abroad, Government and private, may easily reach 15 to 20 billions of dollars in the first few years after the war, assuming always that we are successful in building an organization for the preservation of peace which will give us reasonable hope to expect that the peace of the world will not again be broken, at least for many years to come.

In order to make it possible for the debtor countries to pay the interest and dividends on so large a sum, it is absolutely essential that trade discriminations be eliminated and excessive barriers to the international movement of goods such as tariffs, quotas, etc., be substantially lowered.

Indeed, the Bretton Woods proposals make no sense unless this necessary action is taken so that our foreign debtors will be allowed to service their obligations to us.

Surely, we do not wish to repeat the course we followed after the first World War. We had somewhat the same problem then that we have now. The way we met that problem was to provide lavishly the necessary credits which foreign countries needed for buying our goods, but we accompanied that with three separate advances in the tariff just to make sure that our foreign debtors would be unable to pay us no matter how much they wished

to do so. Everybody remembers the tragic consequences of that policy. We not only lost our money but we also created much international bad feeling as well. Thirty-two nations promptly retaliated by erecting all kinds of barriers against our trade, and from that time until the passage of the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934 there ensued a mad race between nations to see which could do the most to destroy international trade. The resulting damage was so great that it could not quickly be repaired.

Through the authority given in the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the Government is authorized to make agreements with foreign countries whereby concessions in our import duties on goods we purchase from them are traded for reductions in their duties on goods they buy from us.

This act has been in effect for 11 years with highly beneficial results, and there is now pending before the Congress a bill to extend the act for another 3 years and to give to the Government additional bargaining powers under the act.

As you know, this bill made its first hurdle a few days ago when the House Ways and Means Committee approved it by a vote of 14 to 11. But it is being bitterly fought, and the battle is not yet won.

Governments are not alone in setting up barriers to an expanding world trade. Private cartels have developed enormously in the last 25 years and through the control of production, prices, and markets also act to restrict the international exchange of goods. We in the State Department are opposed to such arrangements.¹

The whole basis of the Bretton Woods proposals and of the Trade Agreements Act and of our anti-cartels program is the promotion of an expanding economy and collective security through common action.

As has already been announced by the Secretary of State, an international conference to consider questions of trade and employment will probably be called in the next nine or ten months.

Unless we achieve a great expansion in world economy and an increase in the levels of living of all peoples, a solution of the vast problems before all the nations may well be rendered impossible.

Most wars originate in economic causes.

The bounties of nature are distributed unequally over the earth.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1945, p. 613.

Some countries are rich in one resource and some in another; still others possess almost no subsoil resources.

Hence equality of opportunity for development in the modern world is only possible if all nations have free and equal access to the trade and raw materials of the world.

The belief entertained by many that our high wages and high standard of living are the product of a high tariff is of course an economic fallacy of the first order.

Wages and living standards are high in those countries where the proportion of land and productive facilities is high to that of the population and low in countries where the opposite is true.

Before the first World War the country in western Europe enjoying the highest standard of living had the lowest tariff and the country in western Europe with the lowest standard of living had the highest tariff.

A few years ago Mr. Hull had a survey made which showed that 34 tariff-protected industries in this country paid their workers an average wage of about \$1,100 a year whereas 34 industries having little or no tariff protection and requiring none paid their workers an average of about \$1,800 a year.

The United States has the most efficient industrial plant in the world, and there are very few industries in this country which cannot hold their own in the world market in competition with the industries of other countries.

We lead the world in the art of combining capital, management, and labor in the mass production of goods.

Lying about equally between Europe and Asia, with thousands of miles of seacoast on the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific, with the best systems of transportation and communication in the world, with great natural resources and a great reservoir of capital, we are in an incomparable position to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunities which lie ahead of us.

What are we afraid of?

The only thing we should be afraid of is another world war.

Let us never forget that world peace will always be gravely jeopardized by the kind of international economic warfare which was so bitterly waged between the two world wars.

Democracy and free enterprise will not survive another world war.

For the second time in this generation, our country is faced with the responsibilities and opportunities of participation in world leadership.

At the end of the first World War, we stepped aside and the mantle fell to the ground. This time, the mantle is already around our shoulders, and a devastated and terrified world is hopefully looking to us to help it back to peace and life.

We can do this, but only if our wisdom and vision are equal to our power and influence.

Telegraph Communications Between United States and Ethiopia

MESSAGE FROM THE EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN

[Released to the press May 21]

The President has received from His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, the following reply to the message which the President sent upon the opening on May 17 of direct telegraph communications between the United States and Ethiopia:¹

"GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND. I received with great pleasure your message of greetings, the first to be transmitted by direct radio-telegraph between our two countries. I thank you for your kind personal wishes which I sincerely reciprocate and I join with you in hoping that this new link by promoting the exchange of knowledge and ideas may lead to another closer understanding between our two peoples of each other's ways of thought and approach to the common ideals of freedom and justice and may bind even closer our friendship, the constancy of which we have had many proofs since the dark days of the occupation of our country by our enemy when your government and people steadfastly refused to recognize that deed of spoliation. I and my people wish you, Mr. President, long life and happiness and the great and true-hearted American people prosperity and peace.

"Your sincere friend,

"HAILE SELASSIE."

¹ BULLETIN of May 20, 1945, p. 939.

"For Further Information Ask Your Librarian"

Address by E. WILDER SPAULDING¹

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S published chart on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for an international organization bears the words, "For further information ask your librarian." On the great issue of international security and organization the Department of State has invited the public to send its comments and suggestions direct to the Department, but for information it has suggested that the public go to our libraries.

Indeed, you librarians have an enormous responsibility. Nothing can be more important to the American people than the shaping of the post-war world; nothing can be more important to that process than complete public understanding; and the proper kind of public understanding must be founded upon the bedrock of sound and abundant information. We cannot afford to have a peace that is founded upon public suspicion, misinformation, or partial information. It must be a peace of understanding. And that understanding must come through knowledge and through widespread discussion.

The libraries of the United States are meeting their great responsibility in a way that is altogether admirable. Many of them have not only undertaken to provide the information—the books and periodicals and pamphlets—but have also done yeoman service in promoting discussion of the great international issues of the day and of America's place in the new world. For this purpose they have made themselves centers for displays, for discussion groups, round-tables, and forums; they have collaborated with organized groups and schools and colleges; they have suggested reading lists and topics for discussion and debate; and they have not only put the essential literature on their shelves but they have gathered and grouped it in

special study rooms and centers. Their library bulletins have stressed the need for understanding the problems of the post-war world. In performing these services the American library has demonstrated its willingness and its ability to maintain its place, along with the motion picture, the radio, the press, the school, and the rostrum, as one of the great molders of public thought and opinion. I can only express the hope that the libraries which have the means will, in such ways as these, continue to serve as centers of activity and discussion—not only as dispensers of books.

The servicing of printed matter, however, remains the library's basic responsibility. And here I would hope that the librarian would recognize that there is still much to be done in the vast majority of libraries in equipping the bookshelves and reading-tables with good material on foreign policy and the post-war world. In the average library of the past, foreign policy has been represented by a few neglected volumes, generally thoroughly confused with more attractive tomes on American and European history, and by little or nothing in the periodical room. Newspapers were not selected for their usefulness to students of our foreign relations, and pamphlet material in that field was scanty. The picture is now far brighter. There is a rapidly growing literature in this field. It is now possible to fill the gaps of the past with titles which surpass in interest and appeal the available books in most other fields.

It is unnecessary to admonish the trained librarian to plan his acquisitions so that they will provide a well-balanced diet for his readers. He must of course see to it that he follows no one school of thought in making his selections. But it may be useful to suggest that this subject called "foreign affairs" is now a tremendously complex thing—something far more complicated than the subject matter of the diplomatic histories of the past. The amazingly wide scope of foreign relations—which the acquisitions desk must understand—is apparent

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to us in Washington in the ever-increasing variation in the work of the Department of State. The very names of its divisions and offices indicate this variety of subject matter. The names of those subdivisions of the Department not only include all the geographic areas of the world but they also touch upon legal matters, aviation, shipping, telecommunication, international information, cultural cooperation, international labor, social, and health affairs, petroleum, international conferences, financial and development policy, international security, various economic matters, commercial policy, world-trade intelligence, war-areas economics, and dependent-areas affairs; and I could mention still others. And the Department of State does not have a monopoly of the activities of our Government which concern our relations with the rest of the world. It is one of the librarian's responsibilities to see that his readers see the many facets of our foreign relations—and that responsibility is one that it is not easy to meet. The reader who is led to believe, for instance, that the successful outcome of the San Francisco conference will of itself give us a post-war world of peace and plenty is not getting all he should from his library. He must also realize that the problems set forth at the Hot Springs, Atlantic City, Bretton Woods, Chicago, and Mexico City conferences must also be met, discussed, and decided.

We in the State Department have been glad to notice an increased library interest in the Government's publications in this field. It is easy to underestimate the importance of official publications. Many readers like to avoid those "Government documents" with their drab covers and crowded pages. And it is also easy to overestimate the importance of the official publications. As a matter of fact the thoughtful reader needs both the official and the unofficial—especially when he is studying any subject like foreign policy which operates for the most part only through Government channels. The library which does not provide both official and unofficial reading on matters in this field is giving its readers only a partial, unbalanced diet.

Unofficial books and pamphlets and periodicals that treat of our foreign policies are infinitely more varied, generally more interesting, far broader in scope, and often more critical than the official literature. There is, of course, no official substitute whatsoever for the newspaper press. The unofficial writer can supply much that the product of

the Government Printing Office does not and should not supply. And I would emphasize those last three words: *should not supply*.

As I see it your Government should attempt to give you through the printed page only two things. The first is information. The second is the reason why policies have been adopted—why your public servants believe them to be valid policies. Certainly the American people have a right to information as to what its Government's policies are, and it has a right to technical, scientific, and other factual information which its Government has assembled and which is not available elsewhere in authoritative form. We also, I believe, have a right to know why our officials believe in the policies that have been adopted, and we cannot accept any second-hand explanations which do not come to us directly from the officials themselves. For those official statements we should be able to go to official texts: to the *United States Reports* for instance to examine opinions of the Supreme Court; to the *Congressional Record* and the Senate and House committee reports for the opinions and judgments of members of Congress; and to equally adequate documentation for the Executive agencies. Not only is it essential to the democratic process that public officials render an accounting of their official acts, but it is equally important that that accounting be readily accessible in authoritative form to the whole citizenry. There lies the responsibility of our libraries.

Official white papers and color books as issued by the world's foreign offices have often been viewed with suspicion. "Beware of documents!" said Clemenceau, "They are the pitfalls and ambuscades which the crafty jugglers of the day plant in the path of the unwary historian to waylay, in fact, to mislead him." And a recent English book on the language of diplomacy struck the same note: "Language, said a cynic, was given us to conceal our thoughts"

Your own foreign office, the Department of State, has done much toward overcoming the popular view that foreign policy is a complex mystery clothed in secrecy and manipulation. "The thing about Mr. Stettinius which has impressed me from the first", said a United States Senator in voting for the confirmation of Mr. Stettinius as Secretary of State, "is his total candor with members of Congress. I have never known a man to come from downtown to testify upon the Hill who, so far as I can judge, has made such extreme effort to

give us the benefit of his total information." That, I believe, was one of the finest things which I have heard said about a high public servant. And our Under Secretary of State, Mr. Grew, recently told the Foreign Policy Association that "It is the Department's conviction that the people of the United States are entitled to know what they face in their relations with other countries—what is the background and what are the details which eventually crystallize into what becomes known as 'policy'.¹

Virtually all of the carefully considered statements which the Department releases to the press so that the public may know what decisions have been arrived at, and all of the technical and background data in the field of foreign relations which the Department makes available, are put into print. They are put into print by the Department itself so that they may all be obtained in authoritative form by any who are interested: ". . . the people of the United States are entitled to know . . .," as Mr. Grew said. But the printing of all these official statements, articles, treaties, notes, diplomatic papers, regulations, and announcements will avail but little if our citizenry does not know that they exist. The man in the street may still believe that his Government is making a secret out of our foreign policy—that diplomacy is a black art. And if he believes his Government has no confidence in him he will have no confidence in his Government. If he cannot readily find out what his own Government's foreign policy is, in the very words of his elected officials and their lieutenants, that policy, which should rest upon wide public understanding and criticism and support, will surely suffer.

In 1928 a number of the country's outstanding international lawyers and students of foreign affairs descended upon the State Department and demanded that it start publishing the record of American foreign relations, past and current, in systematic and easily available form. The proposed program received the support of Congress, and it got under way in October 1929. As a result we have in print today a tolerably complete official record of every important development in our foreign policy since 1929. And considering the fact that our series of *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* now runs from 1861 to 1930, we may correctly state that there is a continuous and unbroken record, in

official printing, of American foreign policy from 1861 to the date of the last weekly issue of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN.

Incidentally the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN itself is indicative of the progress that is being made toward telling in print more and more of the story of our foreign policy. Its little predecessor, called *Press Releases*, contained in 1933 only 879 single-column pages; the BULLETIN of 1943 contained 1,058 large double-column pages. Its predecessor carried only 291 single-column pages in the first third of 1935 as compared with 841 large pages in the BULLETIN for the first third of 1945.

It is only within the last few months that the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN has carried special articles. Written by officers of the Department who are actually working in the fields covered on such subjects as "The Allied Blockade", "The Relief of Occupied Greece", "Control of the International Traffic in Arms", "State Department Aid to Cultural Exchange With China", "Trade Controls Today in the Middle East", and the Mexico City conference, they are factual and illuminating. They supply what the briefer, formal, official releases do not always supply. Take, for instance, George V. Allen's article of last year on "American Advisers in Persia". I knew that Persia—or Iran as we now call it—was a most important station on the way to the U.S.S.R. and that that country had worked closely with the Allied governments in the tremendous task of getting supplies to Russia. I remembered the Shuster mission to Iran and knew something of the more recent Millspaugh mission. But I did not know, until I saw Mr. Allen's article, that at the time he wrote there were nearly 75 highly qualified American citizens in Iran advising the Government and aiding in nearly every important phase of the administration of that country. Iran needed assistance in its industrial and financial development, and it turned to American experts who, as the representatives of a distant and disinterested country, were welcomed as technicians and advisers in whom the Iranians could have complete confidence. Dr. Millspaugh with some 60 experts returned to Iran with broad authority in finance and economics; Colonel Schwarzkopf, known for his work in the Lindbergh kidnapping case, went there to direct the gendarmerie; Major General Ridley was loaned

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1945, p. 151.

to reorganize the supply services of the Iranian Army; the late L. S. Timmerman went over to work on the reorganization of the police of Tehran and other principal cities; Dr. Avery of Boston University was selected to advise the Iranian Ministry of Public Health; and other Americans, like Herbert Hoover, Jr., a petroleum engineer, have gone to that country to advise in other fields. These American advisers were not only helping Iran to give the utmost of assistance to the Allied cause; but they were helping that country to build solid administrative and economic foundations for peacetime. The story is a most significant one. And there are many of equal significance in the Department's *BULLETIN*.

I should add that virtually every official statement issued by the Department, many of the addresses of the ranking officers, most of the White House releases relative to foreign policy, and information regarding treaty developments, as well as lists of all of the Department's publications of the week, are included in the *BULLETIN*. It is the Department's one comprehensive informational periodical.

You are doubtless familiar with the fact that the Department publishes *Registers*, *Foreign Service Lists*, *Diplomatic Lists*, and lists of *Foreign Consular Offices in the United States*; that treaties and agreements are issued not only in the *Treaty Series* and the *Executive Agreement Series* but also in the *United States Statutes at Large*, another State Department publication; and that the annual *Foreign Relations* volumes are the definitive and substantially complete compilation of American diplomatic papers. You are probably also familiar with the conference documents—reports, final acts, or descriptive articles—which the Department issues following most of the more important international conferences. There are also a number of special pamphlets and articles—pamphlets like the recent *List of Treaties in Force* and the still more recent list entitled *Treaties Submitted to the Senate 1935-1944*, and articles like those on *Food for the Family of Nations*, *Conference of Allied Ministers of Education*, or *Conference at Bretton Woods Prepares Plans for International Finance*. There is the great eight-volume *Digest of International Law* prepared by Green Haywood Hackworth, the Department's

Legal Adviser, which is a rich mine of information on the backgrounds of American policy and practice.

Popular interest in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for international organization was so overwhelming and so persistent that the Department printed the texts of the Proposals in unprecedented quality and made them available upon request to many thousands of persons, organizations, and libraries throughout the country. Charts of the proposed Organization were also printed in quantity and a lesser number of copies of the seven radio programs on "Building the Peace", in which Department officials participated, were made available. Brief documentation on the important developments from the Atlantic Charter through Dumbarton Oaks was packed into the pamphlet, *Toward the Peace—Documents*.

We should like to see all of these pamphlets and books go into every library in the country. The Department's printing funds are, however, decidedly limited, and it can in general order only enough copies to serve its own official needs. If the Department has extra copies it is always glad to respond to a request from a library. Virtually everything we publish can, of course, be obtained by the depository libraries if they have made the right arrangements with the Government Printing Office, and virtually all of our publications are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office.

Perhaps I have said too much about the publications of the Department of State. Other Government agencies are producing printed matter that is invaluable in any serious study of post-war problems. The unofficial press and all it produces are, and will continue to be, the first concern of most librarians. I would merely hope that when your readers follow the advice on our Dumbarton Oaks poster and ask their librarian for further information on international organization or the post-war world, you would have some official publications on your shelves and reading-room tables as evidence that our Government wants the support of an informed public. The libraries share with the Department of State the responsibility for seeing to it that American foreign policy is built upon understanding and sound information.

Aliens Leaving United States

The following regulations have been codified under Title 22—Foreign Relations, Chapter I—Department of State, Part 58—Control of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States Pursuant to the Act of May 22, 1918, as Amended:¹

§ 58.21 *Definitions.* For the purposes of §§ 58.21 to 58.32:

(a) The term "United States" includes the States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) The term "continental United States" includes the territory of the several States, the District of Columbia, and Alaska.

(c) The term "depart from the United States" means the act of departure by land, water, or air (1) from the United States to any foreign port or place except Canada, or (2) from one geographical part of the United States to a separate geographical part, except to or from Alaska. The term "geographical part" means any of the following: the States, including the District of Columbia, the Panama Canal Zone, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa.

(d) The term "bona-fide seaman" includes every alien whose occupation or calling as such is bona fide and who is signed on the ship's articles or employed, or to be employed, in any capacity on board any vessel, as well as sea-going fishermen and all owners, masters, officers, members of crews, and other alien persons employed on vessels which for purposes of business or pleasure cruise on tidal waters beyond the shoreline or on the Great Lakes.

(e) The term "airman" includes any alien pilot, navigator, aviator, or other alien person operating or employed on any aircraft.

(f) The term "departure-control officer" means any employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service assigned to supervise the departure of aliens from the United States, or any persons assigned by the chief executive officers of the Pan-

ama Canal Zone, Guam, or American Samoa to such duties in those territories, or any person designated by the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands after consultation with the military and naval authorities of the United States and the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

(g) The term "permit-issuing authority" means the Secretary of State, or an officer designated by him, the chief executive officer of Alaska, of Hawaii, of Puerto Rico, of the Virgin Islands, of the Panama Canal Zone, of Guam, or of American Samoa, or the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands acting in consultation with the military and naval authorities of the United States in the Philippine Islands and with the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

(h) The term "passport" includes a passport or official document in the nature of a passport issued by the government of the country to which an alien owes allegiance, or other travel document showing his origin and identity, prescribed in regulations issued by the Secretary of State.

(i) The term "permit to depart" for aliens means a copy of the application for a permit to depart, as described hereinafter in §§ 58.21 to 58.31, inclusive, duly executed by the alien, approved and appropriately endorsed by or on behalf of the Secretary of State, or such modification hereof as may be prescribed.

(j) The term "port of departure" means a port in continental United States, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii designated as a port of entry by the Attorney General or by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, or in exceptional circumstances such other place as the departure-control officer may, in his discretion, designate in an individual case, or a port in Guam, American Samoa, or the Panama Canal Zone designated by the chief executive officer thereof, or any port in the Philippine Islands designated by the permit-issuing authority therein.

(k) The term "alien" means a person who does not owe permanent allegiance to the United States. It does not include a citizen of the United States; nor does it include a citizen of the Philippine Is-

¹10 Federal Register 5895.

lands so long as the Philippine Islands remain under the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.

§ 58.22 Permits to depart required. No alien shall hereafter depart from the United States except at a port of departure and unless there has been issued in accordance with §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, a valid permit to depart or he is exempted under §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, from obtaining a permit to depart.

§ 58.23 Aliens exempted from obtaining permits to depart. Aliens of the following classes shall not be required to obtain permits to depart:

(a) Accredited diplomatic, consular, and other officers of foreign governments recognized by the United States who have been accorded recognition as such by the Secretary of State, such recognition not having been withdrawn, and the members of the family of such officers, as well as their attendants, servants, and employees who have been notified to and recognized by the Secretary of State: *Provided*, That any such person, unless otherwise specifically exempted under these regulations from obtaining a permit to depart, shall obtain an exit visa from the Chief or Acting Chief of the Visa Division of the Department of State, or from another officer authorized by him (an exit visa shall be subject to verification in the discretion of a departure-control officer at the port of departure, if he has reason to question the authenticity of such exit visa);

(b) Native-born Mexican citizens and persons who were naturalized as Mexican citizens before January 1, 1935, lawfully domiciled in Mexico or in the United States, departing across the border between the United States and Mexico;

(c) Aliens who have entered the United States with limited-entry certificates and who are departing from the port through which they entered and within the limits of the period for which they were admitted: *Provided*, That in exceptional circumstances the departure-control officer may in his discretion permit an alien who entered at one port with a limited-entry certificate to depart from another port;

(d) Aliens departing as bona-fide seamen on vessels or to join vessels: *Provided*:

(1) That they submit a passport, unless such document is waived by the Secretary of State;

(2) That where departure is from a port in the continental United States, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii, an alien registration-re-

ceipt card must be presented in cases of aliens who are subject to registration and fingerprinting;

(3) That they present an unexpired Coast Guard identification card, unless specifically waived by the United States Coast Guard, in all cases where such seamen are not sailing exclusively on the Great Lakes;

(4) That a bona-fide alien seaman departing from the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, or Hawaii, who has lost his passport and until he is able to obtain replacement thereof may depart without such document if (i) he is in possession of a Coast Guard identification card and an alien registration-receipt card or, in lieu of an alien registration-receipt card, an affidavit executed before an officer of the American Foreign Service, United States Coast Guard, or Immigration and Naturalization Service, containing an allegation that the alien is unable to obtain a passport or other identifying travel document in the nature of a passport, the alien's signature, and a statement of his age and physical description and (ii) the alien registration-receipt card or the affidavit is stamped and signed by an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to indicate that the bearer may depart from and return to the United States as a seaman on American vessels or American-owned Panamanian or Honduran vessels without a travel or identity document other than a Coast Guard identification card and the document containing this stamp and signature; and

(5) That a bona-fide alien seaman departing shall comply with all other laws and regulations and meet such additional or alternative requirements as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, or the appropriate permit-issuing authorities in the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, or the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

(e) Aliens who have received communications from an American consular officer in foreign contiguous territory to the effect that the documents submitted by them to the consular officer are sufficiently in order to warrant the alien's personal appearance at the consular office in connection with an application for an immigration visa;

(f) Aliens ordered deported from the United States and aliens under deportation proceedings who are given permission to depart at their own expense in lieu of deportation to a specified destination and are departing to such destination;

(g) Immigrant aliens lawfully admitted into the United States who pass in direct transit, without stop-over, through foreign contiguous territory from one part of the United States to another by means of a transportation line which runs through the territory or waters of both countries;

(h) Aliens who presented valid transit certificates or transit visas, or who entered in transit but were exempted from presenting such certificates or visas, upon entering the continental United States and who are departing within fifteen days of the date of admission, except that if the departure-control officer is satisfied that, because of transportation or other difficulties beyond such an alien's control he has been unable to depart within that period, extension of the period may be granted by such officer, no such extension, however, to exceed 60 days from the date of entry;

(i) Aliens of the following classes, departing from the United States after having been admitted under waiver of documents, provided they are, with the exception of subparagraphs (6), (7), and (12) of this paragraph, returning to the country from which they entered;

(1) Officers and employees of the International Boundary Commission who are native-born or naturalized citizens of Mexico and who entered the United States temporarily from Mexico in connection with their official duties;

(2) Immigration and customs officers of the Mexican Government who entered the United States temporarily in the performance of their official duties;

(3) Employees of the Mexican Postal Service assigned to border areas who entered the United States temporarily in the performance of their official duties;

(4) Fire-fighting groups who entered the United States temporarily for fire-fighting activities;

(5) Residents of Mexico who entered the United States temporarily in urgent cases such as those involving serious illness or death, where no opportunity existed to obtain a passport or visa;

(6) Military or naval personnel serving in that capacity on merchant vessels;

(7) Military and naval personnel serving on vessels of war owned or operated by the United States or by governments allied or associated with the United States in the prosecution of the war;

(8) British subjects domiciled in the British Virgin Islands or in the British islands of Anguilla, St. Kitts, and Nevis; French citizens domi-

ciled in the French island of St. Bartholomew and in the French portion of the island of St. Martin; and Netherlands subjects domiciled in the Netherlands islands of St. Eustatius and Saba and in the Netherlands portion of the island of St. Martin, who were admitted into the Virgin Islands for business or pleasure for a period of less than 30 days on any one visit;

(9) Alien members of the armed forces of foreign countries: *Provided*, That they are departing from the United States under official orders or in accordance with the terms of authorized leave;

(10) Officials of the national, or a state, provincial, municipal, or local Government in Mexico who entered the United States from Mexico temporarily for business or pleasure, members of their family and official suites;

(11) Officials and operational or maintenance-of-way employees of transportation lines operating across the Mexican border who entered the United States temporarily in pursuance of their duties;

(12) Aliens who arrived as passengers on ships which were diverted at sea to ports in the United States, having been destined originally to a foreign port, and who are departing on the vessels on which they entered;

(j) Aliens other than seamen who are (1) domiciled or stationed in the Western Hemisphere, who are (2) lawfully in the United States, who are (3) native-born citizens or persons naturalized before January 1, 1935 as citizens of any of the independent countries of the Western Hemisphere, Canada, or Newfoundland, or native-born British or Netherlands subjects, or persons naturalized before January 1, 1935 as British or Netherlands subjects, and who are (4) departing from the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, or the Panama Canal Zone to a destination in the Western Hemisphere (The term "Western Hemisphere" as used herein includes only North, Central, and South America, and the islands immediately adjacent thereto, including Burmuda, the Bahamas, the West Indies, and the Leeward and Windward Islands);

(k) Aliens en route to a destination in the United States with proper documents to apply for admission into the United States, who are passing in continuous travel status through Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Midway Island, Wake Island, Guam, American Samoa, Hawaii, or the Philippine Islands;

(l) Aliens departing on vessels engaged in the fishing industry, who comply with the anchorage regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of the Navy;

(m) Aliens who are members of the armed forces of the United States, who are departing from the United States under orders (except leave orders) of a competent authority, and aliens who are members of the armed forces of countries with whose national governments the United States maintains diplomatic relations, who are departing from the United States under orders (including leave orders) of a competent authority;

(n) Alien children under 14 years of age;

(o) Aliens who are nationals of the United Nations countries whose territory in any part of the world is, or has been, occupied by the enemy, departing from the United States without reentry permits directly to any unoccupied or liberated territory of the country of which they are nationals, or through the necessary United Nations countries en route to such territory;

(p) Aliens residing in the Virgin Islands who have occasion to proceed temporarily to the British Virgin Islands or to the French island of St. Bartholomew.

§ 58.24 Refusal of permission to depart. No permit to depart, exit visa, border-crossing identification card, reentry permit, preexamination border-crossing identification card, or other document facilitating departure or authorization for voluntary departure in lieu of deportation shall be issued to an alien if the issuing authority has any reason to believe that the departure will be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.

§ 58.25 Classes of aliens not entitled to depart. The departure of an alien who is within one or more of the following categories shall be deemed to be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, for the purposes of §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive:

(a) Any alien who is in possession of, and in whose care there is evidence that he is likely to disclose to unauthorized persons, information concerning, the plans, preparations, equipment, or establishments for the national defense of, or the prosecution of the war by, the United States or any of its Allies;

(b) Any alien departing from the United States for the purpose of engaging in, or who is likely to engage in, activities designed or likely

to obstruct, impede, retard, delay, or counteract the effectiveness of the national defense of the United States or the measures adopted by the United States in the public interest or for the defense of any other country;

(c) Any alien departing from the United States for the purpose of engaging in, or who is likely to engage in, activities which would obstruct, impede, retard, delay, or counteract the effectiveness of any plans made or steps taken by any country cooperating with the United States in the prosecution of the war;

(d) Any alien departing from the United States for any country for the purpose of organizing or directing, in or from such country, any rebellion, insurrection or violent uprising in or against the United States, or of waging war against the United States, or of destroying sources of supplies or material vital to the national defense of the United States or to the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the United States for the defense of any other country;

(e) Any alien who is a fugitive from justice on account of an offense punishable in the United States;

(f) Any alien whose presence in the United States is needed as a witness in, or as a party to, any criminal case pending in a court or which is under official investigation: *Provided*, That any alien who is a witness in, or party to, a criminal-court proceeding may be permitted to depart with the consent of the appropriate prosecuting authority, unless such alien is otherwise prohibited from departing under §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive;

(g) Any alien who is registered, or who is subject to registration, for training or service in the armed forces of the United States and who shall not have obtained the consent of his local draft board or an appropriate officer of the Selective Service System to depart from the United States.

§ 58.26 Departure from the Panama Canal Zone. The departure of aliens from the Panama Canal Zone shall be in accordance with the provisions of §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, and such regulations as may be prescribed by the permit-issuing authority in the Canal Zone.

§ 58.27 Departure from the Philippine Islands. The departure of aliens from the Philippine Islands shall be in accordance with the provisions of §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, and such regulations as may be prescribed by the permit-issuing authority in the Philippine Islands.

§ 58.28 Authority to make additional regulations. The permit-issuing authorities in the Panama Canal Zone and in the Philippine Islands may prescribe, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, additional regulations regarding the departure of aliens from the Canal Zone and from the Philippine Islands, respectively, and such regulations may include such additional requirements, exemptions, and exceptions to the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Attorney General as the permit-issuing authorities in the Canal Zone and in the Philippine Islands may deem to be appropriate.

§ 58.29 Departure not permitted in special cases. (a) Any departure-control officer or other authorized official in any individual case may require any alien, or person he believes to be an alien, departing or attempting to depart, even if such person has a permit to depart or is exempted under §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, from obtaining a permit to depart to reply to interrogatories and to submit for official inspection all documents, articles, or other things which are being removed from the United States upon, or in connection with such person's departure.

(b) Any departure-control officer or other authorized official shall temporarily prevent the departure of any person of the class mentioned in the preceding paragraph if such person refuses to answer interrogatories or to submit to such official inspection, or if the officer or official believes the departure of such person would under §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, be prejudicial to the interests of the United States or if directed by the Secretary of State or the Attorney General to prevent such departure. In every such case the officer or other official preventing departure shall temporarily take possession of any travel document presented by the alien. Such action shall be reported immediately by the departure-control officer to the head of his department with a full statement of the facts.

(c) Upon the receipt of a report as contemplated by the preceding paragraph the department head shall, if he considers that the departure of the alien would not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, consult the Secretary of State. In such circumstances an individual so temporarily prohibited from departing shall not be permitted to depart and shall not be entitled to the benefits of any exemptions or

limitations hereinbefore provided, unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that the departure of such person would not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.

§ 58.30 Departure permitted in special cases.

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, the Secretary of State may in his discretion authorize the issuance of a permit to depart to any alien, or may allow any alien to depart without such permit if he deems such action to be in the interests of the United States: *Provided*, That any such authorization which may be applicable to aliens of a particular class shall be concurred in by the Attorney General.

(b) Any departure-control officer may grant any airman emergency permission to depart, but in all such cases a copy of the airman's application shall be forwarded immediately to the appropriate permit-issuing authority or to the Secretary of State. Such emergency permission shall not be granted unless the departure-control officer is satisfied that such departure would not endanger the public safety or be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.

§ 58.31 Applications for permits to depart. Any alien in whose case a permit to depart is required, desiring to depart from the United States, shall apply to the Secretary of State, or to such officer as may be designated, for a permit to depart from the United States as follows:

(a) Blank application forms for permits to depart may be obtained from the Visa Division, Department of State, Washington, D. C., or from an office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or from a permit-issuing authority in the outlying possessions of the United States. Applications should be mailed at least 30 days before the date of intended departure in order that any delay in departure may be avoided: *Provided*, That alien members of the armed forces of the United States departing on authorized leave must make application to do so, which may be in the form of a letter addressed to the Chief of the Exit Permit Unit, Visa Division, Department of State, Washington, D. C., containing the applicant's name and a statement of his nationality, date and place of birth, date and place of last entry into the United States, last residence address in civilian life, alien registration number, and date and port of intended departure, together with a letter from his commanding officer approving leave for the purpose indicated.

(b) Applications for permits to depart from the continental United States, excepting Alaska, shall be made to the Secretary of State, as provided in §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive. Applications for permits to depart shall be made upon form AD-1¹ or such other form as may be prescribed by the permit-issuing authority and executed strictly in accordance with the instructions issued therewith.

(c) Any alien who departs, or attempts to depart, from the United States without complying with §§ 58.21 to 58.32, inclusive, may be subjected to the penalties provided in the act of May 22, 1918, as amended by the act of June 21, 1941.

(d) If the application for permission to depart is approved the applicant will be notified, and one copy of the application, appropriately endorsed, which shall thereupon become the permit to depart, will be forwarded to the appropriate departure-control officer at the port or place from which the applicant has stated in his application

that he intends to depart. In the cases of members of the armed forces of the United States who make application in accordance with the proviso in paragraph (a) of this section, the notification sent to the applicant shall, upon its surrender to the departure-control officer, constitute the permit to depart. Upon the applicant's personal appearance before such departure-control officer, indicated in the notification to the applicant, and upon the identification of such applicant by the departure-control officer, to whom the applicant shall surrender the notification received, the departure-control officer may permit such applicant to depart from the United States and shall verify such departure. The departure-control officer shall thereupon place a notation or certification on the permit concerning the alien's departure and forward such permit, together with the notification surrendered

¹ May be obtained from the Secretary of State upon request.

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by the alien, to the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Under no circumstances should an alien be permitted to take such permit out of the United States or to have such permit in his possession while in the United States.

(e) A permit to depart shall be revocable at any time before departure of the alien in whose case such permit shall have been granted. The Secretary of State reserves the power to revoke a permit which has been issued by any permit-issuing authority.

(f) No permit to depart from the United States shall be construed as a permit to enter any place in the United States.

§ 58.32 *Effective date.* These regulations shall become effective on the first day of the month following the date of issuance and shall supersede the regulations issued on November 19, 1941, as amended.

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.,
Secretary of State.

APRIL 9, 1945.

Concurred in by:

FRANCIS BIDDLE,
Attorney General.

MAY 19, 1945.¹

The text of this regulation also appears under Title 8—Aliens and Nationality, Chapter I—Immigration and Naturalization, Part 175—Control of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States Pursuant to the Act of May 22, 1918, as Amended [Sections 175.21 to 175.32].

THE DEPARTMENT

Responsibility of the Assistant Secretary in Charge of Congressional Relations²

Purpose. This order is issued to redefine the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations and to describe his relationship to other Assistant Secretaries in this connection.

1 Responsibility of the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional Relations. The Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations is hereby relieved from responsibility for the coordination and direction of the

conduct of international conferences, and section 2, paragraph 2, of Departmental Order 1301 is amended to define the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations as follows:

(a) The Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations shall have responsibility for maintaining liaison with the Congress on all matters of interest to the Department, with the exception of matters relating to the budget or to fiscal or other administrative operations. In collaboration with the competent Departmental office or offices, he shall be responsible for the preparation and presentation to the Congress of all legislation (including the submission of treaties and conventions to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification). He shall also be responsible for liaison with the Bureau of the Budget on all matters of interest to the Department, with the exception of matters involving the budget or fiscal or other administrative operations.

2 Relationships with the other Assistant Secretaries.

(a) Section 2, paragraph 6, of Departmental Order 1301 assigns to the Assistant Secretary in charge of administration the responsibility, among other things, for liaison with the Congress on matters of a fiscal or other administrative character. Because of the established relationships between the Assistant Secretary in charge of administration and the Congress on budgetary, fiscal, and administrative matters, and because of the established and necessary liaison between the Bureau of the Budget and the Assistant Secretary in charge of Administration on such matters, he shall retain the responsibility for liaison with the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget on these subjects. However, it shall be the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations and the Assistant Secretary in charge of administration to achieve close coordination in the carrying out of their assigned responsibilities to the end that coordinated liaison and unity of action with respect to the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget may be assured for the Department as a whole.

(b) In directing the preparation of legislation and its presentation to the Congress, the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations shall be guided by the advice of other Assistant Secretaries as to policy affecting their respective fields of responsibility. The Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations shall draw upon the advice of the Offices and divisions whose field of policy is affected.

(c) All Offices and divisions of the Department concerned with any matter of a legislative character, or any program or project which may involve legislative action (including the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of treaties and conventions) shall be guided by the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations concerning the legislative aspects of such programs or projects and shall consult with his office in developing such programs or projects.

(d) The Assistant Secretary shall control consultation with Members of Congress in the formulation of such programs and projects.

3 Reports to Congress. No report to Congress shall be transmitted or approved on behalf of the Department except after clearance with the Assistant Secretary.

¹ Filed with the *Federal Register* May 22, 1945.

² Departmental Order 1322, dated and effective May 17, 1945.

4 Congressional correspondence. (a) All requests, oral or written, for expressions of opinion on pending or proposed legislation shall be referred in the first instance to the Assistant Secretary.

(b) All communications prepared in response to requests for comment on pending or proposed legislation, all communications between the Department and other Government departments and agencies regarding such legislation, and, in general, all communications pertaining to pending or proposed legislation, treaties, or conventions, which are addressed by the Department to the Congress, to chairmen of committees, and to individual Members, shall also be cleared with the Assistant Secretary.

5 Relations with the Bureau of the Budget. Replies to oral or written requests from the Bureau of the Budget for the views of the Department on enrolled enactments of Congress, proposed or pending legislation, and Executive Orders shall be cleared with the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations.

6 Appearance of officers before Congress. (a) The Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations shall arrange consultation by officers of the Department and of the Foreign Service of the United States with Members of Congress regarding legislative projects or matters which may involve legislation.

(b) The Assistant Secretary shall have responsibility for arranging or directing the appearance of officers of the Department and of the Foreign Service before all committees and subcommittees of the Senate or the House of Representatives, except such hearings as are called in connection with appropriation acts for the Department. Any officer requested to appear before a Congressional committee or subcommittee, except in matters concerning Departmental appropriations, shall consult with the office of the Assistant Secretary before responding to such a request.

7. Travel by Members of Congress. The Assistant Secretary shall be responsible for assisting Members of Congress in official or semi-official travel to foreign countries. Offices and divisions of the Department shall immediately inform the Office of the Assistant Secretary of any such proposed travel so that arrangements may be made for aiding in the purposes of the travel.

8 Informal contact with Congress. Individual contacts and communications between officers of the Department and Members of Congress may be allowed in the discretion of the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations.

9 Establishment of a Legislative Liaison Section. There is hereby established a Legislative Liaison Section within the Office of the Assistant Secretary. This section shall serve as the principal point of liaison between the Department and Congress and between the Department and the Bureau of the Budget in all matters within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary. It shall serve in a similar capacity between the Office of the Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations and the Offices and divisions of the Department on all matters relative to Congress. In general, the section shall handle the clearance of inquiries and correspondence from the

Bureau of the Budget and the Congress and arrangements for appearance of officers of the Department and the Foreign Service of the United States before Congressional committees or subcommittees, except as noted above in connection with appropriation acts, and shall advise the Offices and divisions of the Department regarding Congressional opinion on matters of current interest.

10 Previous orders amended. Departmental Order 1301 of December 20, 1944, and any other orders in conflict herewith, are accordingly amended.

JOSEPH C. GREW
Acting Secretary of State

Transfer of Functions¹

Purpose. The purpose of this order is to consolidate certain functions in connection with protocol.

1 Functions transferred. The following functions, covering matters incident to the fulfillment of certain responsibilities of the Secretary of State, are hereby transferred from the Division of Central Services to the Division of Protocol, Office of Departmental Administration:

(a) Preparation of nominations of officers appointed and promoted by the President through the Department of State; issuance of commissions, certificates of designation, and exequaturs; and custody of pertinent records;

(b) Custody of and control over the Great Seal of the United States.

2 Personnel and records. The personnel and records pertaining to these functions also shall be transferred.

3 Amendment of Departmental Order 1301. Departmental Order 1301 (XVII, 4, (g), (2) (3)) is amended accordingly.

JOSEPH C. GREW,
Acting Secretary of State

Appointment of Officers

Frank J. Merkling and Felton M. Johnston as Assistants, and Herbert S. Marks and John H. Ferguson as Special Assistants in the Office of the Assistant Secretary in charge of congressional relations, effective May 17, 1945.

Joseph D. Coppock as Adviser in the Office of International Trade Policy, effective May 2, 1945.

Charles G. Poore as Special Consultant to Assistant Secretary MacLeish, effective May 2, 1945.

R. Edgar Moore as Assistant to Assistant Secretary MacLeish, effective May 2, 1945.

Haldore Hanson as Executive Assistant to Assistant Secretary MacLeish, effective May 2, 1945.

¹ Departmental Order 1321, dated and effective May 15, 1945.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE**Consular Offices**

The American Consulate at Florianopolis, Brazil, was closed on March 31, 1945.

The American Consulate at Bucaramanga, Colombia, was closed effective April 30, 1945.

The American Consulate at Lyon, France, was reestablished on May 16, 1945.

The American Consulate at Bombay, India, is to be raised to the rank of Consulate General, effective July 1, 1945.

PUBLICATIONS**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Interdepartmental Committee on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation, January 1, 1945. Inter-American Series 25 (revised). Publication 2323. ii, 18 pp. 10¢.

The Territorial Papers of the United States. Vol. XII. the Territory of Michigan, 1829-1837, Continued. Compiled and edited by Clarence Edwin Carter. Publication 2236. vii, 1378 pp. \$4.50 (cloth).

Diplomatic List, May 1945. Publication 2328. ii, 129 pp. Subscription, \$2 a year; single copy, 20¢.

FOREIGN COMMERCE WEEKLY

The articles listed below will be found in the May 12 and May 26 issues respectively of the Department of Commerce publication entitled *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Cuba's Economy in 1944", from the American Embassy at Habana, Cuba.

"Turkey: Economic Trends in the Year of War's Crisis", by Edward B. Lawson, Commercial Attaché, American Embassy, Ankara.

AGRICULTURE IN THE AMERICAS

The article listed below will be found in the May issue of the Department of Agriculture publication entitled *Agriculture in the Americas*, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Brazilian Coffee Goes To Market", by Henry W. Spielman, junior agricultural economist, American Consulate General, São Paulo, Brazil.

THE CONGRESS

Foreign Trade Agreements: Report From the Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 3240, a bill to extend the authority of the President under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and for other purposes. H. Rept. 594, 79th Cong. iii, 62 pp. [Department of State, pp. 19-21.] [Favorable report.]

Post-War Disposition of Merchant Vessels: Hearings before the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 1425, a bill to provide for the sale of certain government-owned merchant vessels, and for other purposes, Part 1, March 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 15, 1945. iv, 698 pp. [Department of State, pp. 68-69, 410-442, 480-483, 509-525.]

Nineteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations: Message From the President of the United States transmitting the nineteenth report on lend-lease operations for the period ended March 31, 1945. H. Doc. 189, 79th Cong. 70 pp.

Amending Criminal Code To Protect Witnesses and Jurors. H. Rept. 597, 79th Cong., to accompany H.R. 2709. 3 pp.

The Sugar Situation. Report of the Special Committee To Investigate Food Shortages for the House of Representatives, 1945, pursuant to H. Res. 195, a resolution providing for the appointment of a special committee of the House of Representatives to investigate food shortages. H. Rept. 602, 79th Cong. ii, 14 pp.

International Organization for Educational and Cultural Affairs. S. Rept. 286, 79th Cong., to accompany S. Res. 122. 3 pp.

Draft of a Proposed Provision Pertaining to an Existing Appropriation for the Foreign Economic Administration. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting draft of a proposed provision pertaining to an existing appropriation for the fiscal year 1945 for the Foreign Economic Administration. H. Doc. 185, 79th Cong. 2 pp.

An Act Making appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and the Federal Loan Agency for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, and for other purposes. Approved May 21, 1945. H.R. 2603, Public Law 61, 79th Cong. 37 pp. [Department of State, pp. 1-15.]

Brand Names and Newsprint: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, pursuant to H. Res. 98 (78th Congress), (Extended by H. Res. 93, 79th Congress), a resolution to investigate federal grade labeling of articles or commodities, and the discarding of private brand names; curtailing the production or consumption of newsprint or papers; and any requirements intending to bring about simplification and standardization of production, marketing, and distribution of articles or commodities, as well as concentration of industry or production. Part 1, Newsprint,

March 5, 12, 19, April 16, 17, and 23, 1945. iv, 193 pp. [Department of State, pp. 78-86, 120-124.]

Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 2211, a bill to provide for the participation of the United States in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Volume 1, March 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1945. iv, 513 pp. [Department of State, pp. 32-64, 217-292.]

Supplemental Estimates of Appropriations for the Department of State: Communication from the President

of the United States transmitting supplemental estimates for appropriations for the fiscal years 1945 and 1946, amounting to \$7,677.45 and \$10,137,777.45, respectively, and drafts of proposed provisions pertaining to existing appropriations, for the Department of State. H.Doc. 198, 79th Cong. 4 pp.

Draft of Proposed Revision Pertaining to an Existing Appropriation for the Office of Inter-American Affairs: Communication from the President of the United States transmitting draft of a proposed provision pertaining to an existing appropriation for the fiscal year 1945 for the Office of Inter-American Affairs. H.Doc. 193, 79th Cong. 2 pp.

